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THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM  
IN  
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS

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
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## DEDICATION

To our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, through whom all things are possible and to whom goes all the glory and praise.

Trust in the Lord with all your heart and lean not on your own understanding; in all your ways acknowledge Him, and He will make your paths straight.

--Proverbs 3:5-6

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## INTRODUCTION

The style of politics that has characterized the Italian peninsula has been a Jacobin, oligarchic and fragmented one long before Italy became a nation-state in 1861. The Risorgimento (the entire process leading up to the achievement of Italy's political independence and unification) itself was the work of a minority of the population--most Italians stood passively by. For the first time since the Roman Empire, Italy was unified. But despite the achievements of the ruling regime in the young Italy, those running the country never fully gained the confidence of the citizenry. The people began to distinguish between the "real" and the "legal" nation (paese reale versus paese legale). Just as today, the people then felt that their parliament was out of touch with the real problems they faced, being more concerned with playing political games than caring for their constituents. The public was suspicious and even hostile towards their political leaders, believing they were corrupt and incompetent, and only out to seek personal gain.

In a strangely ironic parallel with the demonstrations today in the north by Lega Lombarda, in Rome by DC politician Mario Segni's Popular Movement for Reform, and in

the south by a cross section of enraged Sicilians, Giustino Fortunato, a leading nineteenth-century spokesman for the South, recounts the public sentiment in post-unification Italy: "Everywhere I go, I hear but a single shout: Down with the Deputies!" <sup>1</sup>

The political system which emerged after the downfall of fascism at the end of World War II seemed to depart dramatically from the pre-fascist tradition: the number and nature of the political parties, the degree of popular participation, the object and tone of the political debate, all seemed to reflect a renewed political atmosphere. In fact, a good deal of innovation had occurred, but there still remained a substantial undercurrent from the pre-fascist era--a large segment of society was still not willing to give the new system a degree of legitimacy. That is, the postwar governments continued to be undermined by an alienated populace and the popular perception of a formidable chasm between paese reale and paese legale. The public failed to fully embrace the Republic's institutions; the government and the people never merged and a crisis of political participation emerged.

In the postwar period the Italian political elite created a multifaceted governing system by combining clientelism, distributive politics, and ideological appeal

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<sup>1</sup> D. Germino and S. Passigli, The Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy (NY: Harper & Row, 1968), 7.



to a diffused populace. The Christian Democrats (DC) took advantage of these elements in the 1950s in an effort to initially become a mass party and, then, a catch-all party.

The Italian polity moved from a period of dominance by the DC from the end of the war to around 1960, to a period of collaboration between the DC and the Socialists (PSI) in the center-left alliance of the 1960s, to the "historic compromise" period of the mid-1970s, when the Italian Communist Party (PCI) openly supported the government. This was followed by a five-party center-left coalition in the 1980s, in which the DC shared power with four smaller parties, until the late 1980s when the Republicans (PRI) withdrew to leave the governing to a four-party center-left alliance. As each new party was brought into government, it began a process of incorporation where the party's organization was merged with that of the State. As benefits from the system were quickly realized, these parties looked increasingly to the state as a source of resources for their party faithful.

Without a doubt, Italy can still be characterized as such today. Observers have often focused on the problems of the Italian political system, which they claim includes everything from immobilism to inefficiency to corruption. They have described the situation as "surviving without governing," "a difficult democracy," etc. Along with these criticisms come recommended solutions and a heated debate

has ensued. The debate is a serious one in that Italy's political leaders are now joining in. In fact, institutional reform is near the top of Prime Minister Amato's agenda for leading the country out of the socio-politico-economic abyss in which it now finds itself.

Politicians and academics alike have proposed a multitude of solutions, but little agreement exists. Many say the situation is "blocked," or stalemated. On the contrary, LaPalombara claims that democracy, Italian style, is "above all else the art of permitting free government to endure under conditions that logically appear highly improbable." <sup>2</sup> Certainly, those parties currently in power would agree with Tarrow's assessment of the need for reform:

The Italian political genius has never been found to lie in sweeping changes or radical reforms, but in papering over differences, finding accommodations among apparently irreconcilable opponents, and in putting off for tomorrow what could--at some risk--probably be solved today, for fear of upsetting delicate equilibria between social partners or political opponents. <sup>3</sup>

The debate for institutional reform was carried to the Italian people in April 1992 with the nation's parliamentary elections. Although the elections resulted in a Government based on the same four-party coalition as the previous one, the ruling parties experienced severe voter dissatisfaction

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<sup>2</sup> Joseph G. LaPalombara, Democracy, Italian Style (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), xi.

<sup>3</sup> Sidney Tarrow, "Italy: Crisis, Crises or Transition?" P. Lange and S. Tarrow, eds., Italy in Transition: Conflict and Consensus (London: Frank Cass, 1980), 180.

and now have a mere 16 seat majority in the 630-seat Chamber of Deputies. Many of those favoring reform claim that the unprecedented large losses suffered by the major parties coupled with the massive gains by the reform-minded Lombard League represents a mandate for change.

Together with the results of the election are a number of factors that are increasing the pressure on the parties to reach a consensus on institutional reform:

a) The collapse of communism and of the PCI, making a system based on keeping communists out of power obsolete.

b) Deepening political corruption revelations that have turned increasing numbers of Italians away from the traditional political parties.

c) The rise of Lega Lombarda and the other northern-based leagues that are advocating a radical rupture of the First Republic.

d) The growing use of referenda to address shortfalls in the political system and to bypass the stagnated legislative process.

e) The growing influence of European Community (EC) decisions in Italy's affairs and increasing pressure from the EC to comply with those decisions.

f) Europe's economic downturn and Italy's own fiscal and monetary crises which threaten the nation's economic standing, not permitting the state to fill every need and

therefore implying that political choices and sacrifices must be made.

Although the Italian Republic is still young and the concept of the Italian nation-state a relatively recent one, the forces which created the Italian political culture have been at work for many centuries. Italy's unique form of politics and political party system, products of this political culture, and the problems associated with them are deeply entrenched. Only time will tell whether Giuliano Amato will be able to hold his fragile coalition together long enough to get Italy on the road to serious reform. Even still, it will take much longer than one Government's term to effectively change the way Italian politics are conducted.

The overall intent of this work is to examine the current debate on institutional reform in Italy and, in so doing, answer the question: "Can and, if so, will political change be instituted in Italy?" I will first look at the data from Italy's most recent parliamentary elections to explore both the elements of continuity and the elements of change from preceding elections. Once establishing the current political climate in Italy, I will pursue the various determinants for reform. Beginning with how Italy's political system is structured, several proposed reforms will be reviewed and their potential for success evaluated.

Then, the need for political reform and its future prospects will be considered in light of the ever-widening socio-economic disparity between north and south. Finally, I will focus on the Lombard League and its meteoric rise on the Italian political scene as a specific case study in the ongoing political reform debate.

## CHAPTER ONE

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1992 Parliamentary Elections:

Implications for Change

The outcome and implications of the 1992 parliamentary elections held in April 1992 for the parties and personalities of Italy, and the subsequent policy decisions, are still to be fully understood. Nonetheless, reflections on, and analysis of, these developments is possible and may lead to some interesting conclusions. The precedent-setting results of the elections alone are quite remarkable given the Italian Republic's history of a stable electorate. It is very likely that the changes resulting from the election will make 1992 a watershed year in Italian politics. This chapter will begin by covering the election campaigns of the major parties, then describing the results of the election, followed by an analysis of those results. After reviewing the post-election dynamics in the selection of the president and prime minister, the chapter will conclude with what the 1992 election may portend for the future of the Italian polity.

Seen in the light of the apparent rising tide of reform in Italian politics, these elections most certainly have considerable significance for the future shape of the Republic. The reform debate will be covered in greater depth in the next chapter, but it is interesting to note here the claims of Martinotti in his study of electoral trends from 1970-1985. He postulates that the lack of alternation, not political instability or crisis as so many

others claim, is the "real crux of the Italian system."<sup>1</sup> This point seems to have particular relevance for the 1992 elections as the same coalition continues to run the government despite the losses incurred by the main parties.

### **The Election Campaign**

Although each party had several agenda items which it was trying to emphasize throughout its campaign leading up to the election, the platforms can be classified in one of two camps: traditional or protest forces. The former, essentially those parties comprising the quadripartito, or ruling four-party coalition, consisted of the Christian Democrats (DC), the Socialists (PSI), the Social Democrats (PSDI), and the Liberals (PLI); the latter included the renamed communists (PDS), the communist hardliners (Communist Refoundation), the neo-fascists (MSI-DN), the Greens, La Rete ("The Network"), and the Lombard League. The campaign, in general therefore, was one where the notion of "stability" was pitted against that of "change."

Parties advocating change in an election are, of course, nothing new in Italy and in politics in general. What was new in 1992 was the unprecedented, active participation of the small business sector in the protest

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<sup>1</sup> Guido Martinotti, "Electoral Trends in Italy: The Cycle 1970-85," West European Politics, vol.9, no.2 (April 1986), 255.



effort and the emphasis in this movement on the importance of efficacy and efficiency in the country's public services and administrative bureaucracy to the detriment of a coherent, ideological program of the parties comprising the anti-government forces.<sup>2</sup>

The DC campaigned on an agenda calling for "stability and governability" and to oppose those sfascisti, or dismantlers, who aimed to break up the country. They intended to reveal the infirmity of the opposition's plan for an alternative government, claiming "chaos and ungovernability" would result if the opposition were elected. DC party secretary, Arnaldo Forlani, stated that the citizens had a right to know that the alternative consisted of the PDS, the Republicans (PRI), the Communist Refoundation, and Lega Lombarda and claimed they had nothing in common with each other and furthermore would be unable to form a government. Forlani continually stressed the importance of the solidarity and homogeneity of the four-party coalition.<sup>3</sup>

To convince voters that the DC leadership indeed was in tune with public dissatisfaction with the "old equilibrium," the Christian Democrats promised a "renewal" with top officials who could translate fresh ideas into effective

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<sup>2</sup> "L'Italia al voto della verità," Corriere della Sera, 5 April 1992, 1.

<sup>3</sup> "Forlani contro il Pri e le Leghe," Il Messaggero, 30 March 1992, 3.

action, They even left open the possibility of opening up to the PDS in parliament on the subject of institutional reform.<sup>4</sup>

The Socialists emphasized Italy's need for stability and held up its party secretary, Bettino Craxi, as the next prime minister to guide the country out of its political crisis. Craxi, as well, expressed apprehension that a large turnover of votes to the opposition could result in the "Balkanization" of the Italian peninsula rendering the nation ungovernable. He also underscored the importance and priority of focusing the nation's efforts on economic recovery, but added that there was a need for the new government to launch some urgent reforms.<sup>5</sup>

The campaign strategy of the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) was aimed at the PSI and the entire system of power that revolves around the Socialists and Christian Democrats. Nonetheless, Achille Occhetto, PDS party secretary, seriously considered the idea of entering the government coalition with his rivals. He would condition any such move, however, by demanding first institutional and then economic reform. Throughout, the PDS attempted to portray itself as the sole representative of the Left as well as the protest vote. Occhetto even went as far as

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<sup>4</sup> "Stabilità contro cambiamento," L'Indipendente, 4 April 1992, 4.

<sup>5</sup> "Craxi, la legge elettorale non è urgente," Il Messaggero, 30 March 1992, 2.

claiming that his party was the true symbol of the old Italian Communist Party (PCI) and that the Communist Refoundation was merely an "imitation in order to gain votes." <sup>6</sup>

La Rifondazione Comunista, on the other hand, laid claim to the heritage of the PCI and to be the only true communists in Italy. Refoundation party official, Lucio Libertini, rebuffs Occhetto:

[Occhetto] organized 2 conferences in order to close down the PCI, declared that communism was dead and that he was content and asked to be allowed to enter Socialism International... This tactic of his is trasformismo in the last hour: it will last 10 days. After the election he will return to thinking about governing and will forget about the PCI and communism. <sup>7</sup>

The Republicans campaigned for a government comprised of non-partisan technicians, with ministers chosen for their technical expertise rather than political allegiance. They called for the election to "clean out the power palaces" and to "unite Italy." Their specific platform included immediate measures for economic recovery and a new electoral law which would allow for only two or three political parties. <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> "Rissa sul voto comunista," La Stampa, 29 Mar 92, 4.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> "Stabilità contro cambiamento," L'Indipendente, 4 April 1992, 4.

The Neo-fascists' campaign slogan was "Punish the partocracy." They called for every vote to act like an axe in bringing down the current system and prepare for the Second Republic.<sup>9</sup>

One of the new parties in the 1992 elections, La Rete, ran an anti-government, anti-corruption campaign, calling for the abolition of parliamentary immunity and of the excessive subsidies to the Mezzogiorno. Ex-mayor of Palermo and party leader Leoluca Orlando promised an honest assault on the Mafia and its infiltration into Italian politics, especially in the South. Their intent is to eliminate political collusion and cause the collapse of the quadripartito where, they claim, "the same people have governed for 47 years." <sup>10</sup>

As the election drew near, voter uncertainty and cynicism towards the system seemed to peak. In a Corriere della Sera poll two weeks before the election, 86 percent felt little or no change would result from the elections while only 9 percent believed an important change would occur. Nonetheless, 90 percent still planned to vote.<sup>11</sup> A week later in a national poll of 2000 conducted by Panorama, the conclusions drawn were mixed. They foreshadowed

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> "Sfiduciati, pero alle urne," Corriere della Sera, 25 March 1992, 4.

disaster for two members of the ruling coalition (DC and PSDI) as well as for two of the opposition (PDS and MSI-DN); and success for two government parties (PSI and PLI) as well as three anti-government parties (Lega, Greens, and PRI).<sup>12</sup> Next, we will see just how these parties fared.

### **Results of the Election**

Election returns in 1992 deviated markedly from previous parliamentary elections. The electorate delivered a serious rebuff to the ruling coalition as its collective share of the vote fell from 53.7 percent in 1987 to 48.8 percent in 1992 (see Table 1). Despite falling under 50 percent, however, the quadripartito managed to maintain a slim 16 seat majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The DC was clearly the biggest loser as their percentage of the national vote fell under 30 percent for the first time in its history. Gains in the south were not nearly enough to offset the severe losses it suffered in the north (see Table 2). Among the more notable DC politicians who were caught in the northern ambush were Guido Carli, DC treasury minister, who lost his seat in Genoa, and Guido Bodrato, DC industry minister, who failed to get elected in Turin.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> "Sondaggio," Il Messaggero, 29 March 1992, 2.

<sup>13</sup> EIU Country Report: Italy, no. 2 (June 1992), 10

The Socialists lost a small amount of support and, more importantly, failed to overtake the PDS despite the latter's continuing crisis of transitioning from communism to social democracy. Moreover, the PSI's first parliamentary election setback since Craxi assumed his party leadership role in 1976 hurt his chances in being considered for selection as Italy's next prime minister. Like their Christian Democratic colleagues, the Socialists' significant gains in the south were not enough to outweigh their losses in the north. In the aftermath of the election, Socialists were characterizing their results as an "erosion" rather than a "defeat," although they failed to reach the 14 percent level which Craxi considered the minimum necessary for public confirmation of the Socialist platform and his leadership of the party.<sup>14</sup>

The other parties of the coalition--the PLI and PSDI--suffered mixed fortunes; while the Liberals increased their vote to 2.8 percent, the Social Democrats continued to experience a declining constituency, falling .3 percentage points to 2.7 percent.

The PDS had mixed results. The party lost ten percentage points in 1992 when compared to the 26 percent it gained in 1987 as the PCI. Even after combining the percentages of the PDS and the Communist Refoundation, the

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<sup>14</sup> "Forlani medita già le dimissioni," L'Indipendente, 7 April 1992, 1.

total still falls four percentage points short of the PCI total in 1987. Nonetheless, Occhetto proclaimed victory: "We remain the first party of the Left and the ruling coalition has lost its majority." <sup>15</sup>

Out of the ashes of the PCI rose the Communist Refoundation, exceeding all expectations with its 5.4 percent of the national vote. Party secretary Sergio Garavini described the results as "a great success that demonstrates the existence of communists [in Italy] and the necessity of an opposition of the Left." <sup>16</sup>

Leoluca Orlando and La Rete were successful in Sicily where they won 7.5 percent of the vote; their message was evidently also well received nationwide where they managed to secure 2.2 percent of the vote. Orlando described this election as an "epochal vote which decreed the end of the state regime." <sup>17</sup>

The Lombard League expected to win 10 percent of the vote nationwide but fell short of that target. Nonetheless, their 55 seats in the lower house represents a dramatic improvement since the last general election and this will be covered in much greater detail in Chapter Four.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> "La Rifondazione parte con quasi il 6 per cento," L'Indipendente, 7 April 1992, 6.

<sup>17</sup> "Nella Rete di Orlando una vittoria a Palermo," L'Indipendente, 7 April 1992, 6.

## Post-Election Dynamics

The precedent-setting results of the elections directly affected the subsequent maneuverings among the political parties in selecting a new president and prime minister. Three major figures from the DC and PSI--Forlani, Andreotti, and Craxi--were eliminated early on in the process. The influence of the old guard of the DC was severely weakened by the party's poor showing in the election and Craxi was hurt by both the election and the Milan bribery scandal, where several close aides were implicated.

Voting for the successor to President Cossiga began on 13 May 1992. The first three rounds were viewed as a test to see whether the outgoing coalition could rely on their members to support the leadership choice. This failed as the parties were deeply divided. After a series of late-night negotiations and another inconclusive round of voting, the DC nominated Forlani for the presidency. He won 479 votes, short of the 508 needed, but should have received 60 more had all the coalition members supported him. Forlani was perhaps too closely associated with the traditional system of DC hegemony and perceived to be out of touch with the reform attitude of the electorate. A compromise candidate was needed--one who understood the political system and yet was considered to possess a morally and ethically clean record. The presidents of the upper and



lower houses of Parliament, Giovanni Spadolini and Oscar Luigi Scalfaro respectively, were two logical choices. On the sixteenth round of voting, Scalfaro secured 672 votes from a voting alliance of the coalition partners, Radicals, Greens, and La Rete to win. His victory represented a strong consensus of support from across the political spectrum for an individual very open to reforming Italy's political institutions. Corriere della Sera characterized Scalfaro as the DC's "most Catholic MP" and a "white Pertini," or a Catholic version of the highly respected Socialist ex-president Sandro Pertini.<sup>18</sup>

Further evidence that the DC was hurt in the election was seen with the nomination of the prime minister. Although the Christian Democrats remained the largest party, they did not have the electoral backing to secure the prime minister's position for one of their own. In June 1992, three months after the April election, Socialist and former treasury minister Giuliano Amato was formally invited by the president to form Italy's 51st government. For only the third time since the founding of the Republic, someone other than a Christian Democrat would be occupying the Palazzo Chigi. What is even more significant is the fact that Amato may rank as low as fourth in the Socialist Party hierarchy. Those with higher standing--Craxi, vice-secretary Martelli,

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<sup>18</sup> "Due grandi elettori," Corriere della Sera, 26 May 1992, 1.

former foreign minister DeMichelis--had been discredited, at least for the time being, by the PSI's poor election performance and possible involvement in the Milan municipal corruption scandal. The precarious majority of the quadripartito notwithstanding, the Amato Government immediately set about presenting itself as determined and innovative, committed to carrying out institutional reform, bringing the country's public finances under control, and confronting the Mafia's assault on the State.

### **Implications**

Even a brief analysis of the results of the 1992 elections can lead to some interesting implications for the future of the Italian political party system as we know it. The election inaugurated a period of uncertainty even greater than that of preceding years with good possibilities for dramatic change, though the direction of that change is unclear.

Almost certainly the election results implied a "consistent anti-incumbent and anti-governmental policy sentiment" that "while it may not have been clear what the voters wanted, it was clear that they did not want what they were getting." <sup>19</sup> Caputo further puts forth the possibility

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<sup>19</sup> David Caputo, "Italy's Parliamentary Elections: New Directions or Only Minor Deviations from the Past?" Italian Journal, no. 2 & 3, vol. 6, 1992, 4.

that a new era in Italian politics is upon us, where the voter "has indicated a clear desire for change" and that "the 'old' ways of doing things are no longer acceptable."<sup>20</sup>

Carol Mershon's study of voter volatility in Italian parliamentary elections from 1948 to 1992 seems to support this notion of newness in Italian politics. She uses an index of "aggregate volatility" to focus on the change in votes and parliamentary seats between successive elections (see Table 3). After a couple initial volatile elections, shifts among parties in votes and seats dropped off and volatility remained at a low level. The mean volatility in votes between 1948 and 1987 was, in fact, .10; in seats it was a mere .09. Mershon notes 1976 as slightly higher than normal due to the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18. She points out 1992, therefore, as the "major exception to the postwar norm" and an election which "delivered a shock of uncommon magnitude that ended long-standing electoral stability." She concludes by stating that the Italian party system "appears to have entered a new phase of movement and change."<sup>21</sup>

One result not previously mentioned--voter turnout--may imply otherwise, however. The total number of Italians voting in the 1992 election was down by one and one half

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Carol Mershon, "The 1992 Parliamentary Elections: How Much Change?" Italian Politics & Society, Summer 1992, 54-5.

percent compared to 1987 (see Table 4). Even in the supposedly outraged northern regions voter participation declined by one percent. As Caputo claims, "the absence of a surge in voting participation may indicate that the underlying disenchantment was not substantial enough to cause the Italian voters to go to the polls in record numbers." <sup>22</sup>

The geo-political cleavages widened as a result of the election as the DC and PSI became increasingly entrenched in the south and the Lombard League more powerful in the north. This could make the road to reform more difficult for Amato to travel as he attempts to initiate change across the national spectrum.

Other implications focus on the DC. It appears that the Christian Democrats are engaging in damage control in the face of their worst defeat ever. Their long-term strategy will probably include minimizing the importance of its poor electoral performance and emphasizing its current identity of moderation and experience, while simultaneously conceding token measures to the reformist camp within the party.<sup>23</sup>

Party cohesion is of critical importance as the party leadership tries to prevent debilitating, internecine warfare among its many factions. A complete purge of DC

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<sup>22</sup> Caputo, 4.

<sup>23</sup> EIU Country Report: Italy, no. 2, 1992, 14.

leadership ranks is, however, highly unlikely. A rapid turnover in the DC slate is normally very difficult due to the party's nature of factionalism, its decentralized method of selecting candidates, and the popularity of certain individuals in particular regions. The beginning of that turnover, however, may have already begun as a result of the 1992 elections. In a comprehensive study of the 1976 parliamentary elections, Giuseppe DiPalma discusses this same issue of leadership renewal which has interesting parallels to the scenario in the DC ranks in 1992:

The DC is not a tight party of cadres like the PCI, which considers its MPs party members whom it can regularly assign to other party functions ...Further, the [DC] MPs with the longest tenure are also those that occupy the most important positions in government, in the parastate, in local politics, and in the party itself...An effective renovation of this parliamentary contingent would require eliminating many of those with the longest experience of government--with seemingly grave consequences for the party.<sup>24</sup>

Samuel H. Barnes indirectly addresses the question of whether the departure of DC veterans Andreotti, Forlani, Carli, and Bodrato as a result of the election will have "grave consequences for the party":

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<sup>24</sup> G. DiPalma, "Christian Democracy: The End of Hegemony?" H. Penniman, ed., Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1976 (London: AEI, 1977), 138

Elections and the electoral system have played an important role in the system's adaptation to societal changes. The parties have had to change, to adapt. In the process they have undergone a transformation, clinging to the old labels and forms while altering behavior and policies. Elections have not only been the way to keep score: they have been goads to change, active agents of political transformation. The struggle for electoral survival has kept the parties in tune with changes in society. In the process, old myths have been discarded... Organizational survival and vitality have led to massive shifts in the political agenda, in the organization and fortunes of the parties, in their election strategies and behavior.<sup>25</sup>

So, contrary to how Vittorio Feltri described the outcome of the election--"the ruling coalition is dead, the partocracy is wounded and the First Republic is on its knees"<sup>26</sup>--the same four parties are running the government and the partocracy is seemingly operating as before. Amato appears to be accomplishing tasks which before the election would have taken much longer, if at all; but whether the First Republic will stand remains to be seen and I will continue to examine that question in the succeeding chapters.

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<sup>25</sup> S.H. Barnes, "Elections and Italian Democracy: An Evaluation," H. Penniman, ed., Italy at the Polls, 1979 (Wash, DC: AEI, 1981), 282.

<sup>26</sup> "Governo di tecnici o governissimo," L'Indipendente 7 April 1992, 1.

CHAPTER TWO

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Structural Determinants  
for  
Institutional Reform

The political chaos resulting from the April 1992 parliamentary elections and the increasing strength of the cross-party referendum movement led by Christian Democrat Mario Segni have raised the profile of the reform debate across Italian society. Much has been said during this debate about other forms of government and countless comparisons with Italy's political party system made with Weimar, the French Third and Fourth Republics and Germany's present day system. Invariably, the conclusion is reached that if only Italy adopted France's or Germany's reforms, the problems endemic to Italian politics would somehow just disappear. This line of thinking is lacking in that it does not contribute to our understanding of the inner workings of the Italian political party system, nor does it give us an idea of how this system will accept reform. Thus, in this chapter I will attempt to show how the political party process actually works and just how feasible reform may be. I will do this by first noting some peculiarities of democrazia all'italiana. After describing the current state of some of Italy's political institutions, I will review some specific reforms that have been proposed by politicians and scholars alike. DiPalma says that defects in the Italian polity such as a fragmented party system and the presence of strong political subcultures threaten political performance and are the primary reason for the nation's



"syndrome of malaise." <sup>1</sup> On the contrary, LaPalombara says these "defects" are reasons why its political parties have contributed to Italy's economic, political and social successes.<sup>2</sup> We shall now examine how such contradictory statements can be made by scholars in their respective analyses of the Italian polity.

### **Peculiarities of Italian Style Democracy**

Parties are strategic intermediate structures, straddling society and decisional institutions ...they are what shapes and sets the tone of the political society; they are, by and large, what the political society is all about. But parties are also significant agenda setters for decisional institutions. They influence and control the flux of issues with which the latter deals and by claiming representation of the political society, lend legitimacy to the agenda as what voters are concerned with.<sup>3</sup>

The political parties in Italy fit the above description well in that they do, in fact, control the other decisional institutions. To a large extent, they collectively control most institutions in society, be it public or private. This domination of society by the

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<sup>1</sup> Giuseppe DiPalma, "Unstable Cabinets, Stable Coalitions," G. DiPalma and P. Siegelman, eds., Italy in the 1980s: Paradoxes of a Dual Society, San Francisco: SF State UP, 1983, 221-2.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph LaPalombara, Democracy, Italian Style, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1987, 284.

<sup>3</sup> DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing, 221-2.

parties is what is known as partitocrazia, or partocracy,<sup>4</sup> and it stems from the penetration of the very lives of the citizens by the political parties. The powerful nature of the partocracy originated with the birth of the Republic when the parties virtually wrote the constitution and established themselves as the defacto pre-eminent political institution.<sup>5</sup> They have since branched out into industrial, banking and para-political institutions, professional associations, sports clubs and the media, to name a few. In the industrial arena, the Christian Democrats (DC) control the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) while the Socialists (PSI) have assumed control of the National Hydrocarbons Corporation (ENI). Para-political institutions include entities in the commercial and agricultural fields e.g. National Federations of Small Farmers (DC), Peasants' Alliance (Communists-PDS); and labor unions, e.g. the Italian Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CISL) (DC), the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL) (PDS), and the Union of Italian Labor (UIL) (Social Democrats and Republicans). Media penetration includes newspapers, e.g. "Il Popolo" (DC), "L'Unita'" (PDS), "Avanti!" (PSI); publishing houses, e.g. Cinque Lune (DC), Editori Riuniti

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<sup>4</sup> Geoffrey Pridham, "Making Sense of Italian Coalitions," in L. Quartermaine and L. Pullard, eds., Italy Today: Patterns of Life and Politics (Exeter, England: Exeter Press, 1985), 81.

<sup>5</sup> F. Spotts and T. Weiser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), 4.

(PDS), Edizioni dell' Avanti! (PSI); and television stations, e.g. Channel 1 (DC), Channel 2 (PSI), Channel 3 (PDS). Allum asserts that parties involve themselves as such in order to maintain a "permanent political presence in civil society."<sup>6</sup> This is achieved primarily through lottizzazione, or the patronage system in which jobs and other valuable items are distributed among the more powerful parties. During the time of DC hegemony, the DC was privy to the vast majority of patronage. As their share of the electoral votes decreased, so did their preponderance over the highly sought-after positions. As it had to form coalitions to maintain its power base in the government, they were forced to give up some patronage hand-outs to the other coalition members; the PSI especially benefitted from this. Socialist penetration notwithstanding, the Christian Democrats still control about three-quarters of the state-mediated resources.<sup>7</sup> Patron-client politics run rampant through the lives and institutions of the Italian people. LaPalombara calls this the political saturation of life, which is exacerbated by the fact that Italy is a small scale society.<sup>8</sup>

Parties are tied to the bureaucracy via parentela, or

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<sup>6</sup> P.A. Allum, Italy-Republic Without Government? (NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), 69.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Donovan, "Party Strategy and Center Domination in Italy," West European Politics 12 (October 1989), 124.

<sup>8</sup> LaPalombara, 85.

kinship relationships. The partocracy has attempted to colonize the bureaucracy by means of lottizzazione because of the patronage potential that exists there. The power that a party may wield in a given sector is magnified to even a greater extent where clientela, or clientelist relationships, between a bureaucratic agency and an interest group and parentela between the party and agency intersect and overlap. For example, Catholic interest groups and DC strongholds in the ministries of agriculture, development of the South and public works.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to parentela and clientela, party financing is another behavioral aspect of the partocracy that demonstrates just how interwoven it is with the rest of society. Since party dues comprise only a small part of credits, parties rely on other sources to cover the difference. These include local and central government patronage, the latter being of prime importance. Its importance to the parties is obvious when one observes the struggles that ensue among coalition parties vying for appointments of their proteges. Openings have been left vacant for months at a time during such struggles, thereby paralyzing government action. Another financial source for the parties includes interest groups and private companies. Confindustria (Confederation of Italian Industry) has contributed to the Liberals (PLI) and the DC. It has been

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<sup>9</sup> LaPalombara, 226.

understood that industrial groups such as Fiat, Pirelli, and Olivetti have financially supported the DC, Social Democrats (PSDI) and the Republicans (PRI).<sup>10</sup>

It has been argued that the inflated party bureaucracies have an ever-increasing appetite for funds and this has encouraged illegal funding of the parties by way of rigging public works contracts and political payoffs. The 1992 Milan municipal corruption scandal is the latest and, perhaps, most widespread example of how patronage by the parties can lead to a deeper problem. These party bureaucracies continue to control the appointments to top positions in numerous state and para-state corporations which handle large public contracts, i.e. local health organizations, local public transit companies, and the airport authorities. The Milan case is particularly poignant as it has involved politicians from across the political spectrum, to include the Christian Democrats, the 'incorruptible' PDS, and the PSI, who has long prided itself on 'clean government' during its long history of running Milan.<sup>11</sup>

The power of the partocracy is clearly evident when looking at how individual politicians interact with their party. The parties make or break their politicians; only a

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<sup>10</sup> Allum, 83-4.

<sup>11</sup> "Milan scandal deals a heavy blow to Craxi," Financial Times, 5 Aug 1992, 3.

very small minority are well known enough to the public to be able to maintain a constituency. It is the party's prerogative to decide whether to put a politician on the party list and, if so, where on the list.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, each party's political elite can and does exercise considerable power and influence over their respective parties. This is most notable where party factions are involved. Save the traditionally disciplined PDS, all the large parties in Italy are coalitions of powerful factions. The DC is the best example and is often characterized as a 'catch-all' party. The Christian Democratic party is comprised of five factions. The Grande Centro, also known as the Gulf faction after the Gulf of Naples around which Antonio Gava has his electoral base, is the largest. Arnaldo Forlani, from the central region of Marche, and Emilio Colombo, whose power base is located in heavily-DC Basilicata, also wield considerable influence in the Grande Centro. The Andreottiani had, at least up until the 1991 national elections, followed the powerful Giulio Andreotti. The Forze Nuove, or "new forces," are led by Carlo Donat Cattin, a Catholic populist from the north. The Fanfaniani, small but influential, are led by the venerable Amintore Fanfani. The Sinistra, or "left," faction, with electoral roots in the northern region of Lombardy, has been the

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<sup>12</sup> R. Heller, ed., "Politics and Foreign Affairs," Italian Business Review 1 (Nov 1988), 10.

leading force of change in the Christian Democratic party. Ciriaco De Mita, its leader, has pushed for strong, centralized leadership in the party.<sup>13</sup>

The Italian political party system, its ruling elite, and its policies contribute to what has been called Italy's "stable instability." The DC has maintained its hegemony in the government since 1948. Only twice prior to the 1992 election has there been a prime minister from a party other than the DC: Spadolini (PRI) in 1981 and Craxi (PSI) in 1983. Even then, however, the vast majority of ministerial positions went to the DC.<sup>14</sup> Generally speaking, the majority (60% on average) of cabinet members of a fallen government are reappointed by the next government. Those not included in the new government are usually appointed at a later time as governments rise and fall. So, in spite of 50 governments in the 45 years of the Republic, there remains a constant "pool" of elite politicians who provide relative stability and continuity in the operation of the government.<sup>15</sup> This "pool" has included Emilio Colombo, Italy's current foreign minister, who first entered the cabinet in 1955 and has since been prime minister (PM) and treasury minister off and on for nine years. Giulio

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<sup>13</sup> "Choice of Italian sauces," The Economist, 17 June 89, 57.

<sup>14</sup> V. Belfiglio, "The Italian Political System," Italian Journal, vol. III, no. 5, 1989, 9.

<sup>15</sup> DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing, 41-2.

Andreotti has served in 27 ministries and has been PM seven times previously. Paolo Emilio Taviani has been a minister of some sort on 22 different occasions and the list goes on. In a study conducted by Mauro Calise and Renato Mannheimer, it was discovered that of the 1331 ministerial and subcabinet positions held between 1946-1976, only 152 politicians maintained two-thirds of them. In fact, a mere 31 held 480 of the positions. This illustrates what has been called the DC's "own alternative government." <sup>16</sup>

Another aspect of the Italian political party system can also be seen in the voting patterns and preferences of the Italian electorate. Despite the fact that the citizenry has the ability to reward and punish parties with their electoral support, they rarely do. Italian voters who flood to the polls in record numbers each election, are the least supportive of parties on the extreme left or right and have demonstrated consistent party preference voting.<sup>17</sup> Over the past 40 years, shift in voter support between successive elections has varied an average of only 1.6 percent.<sup>18</sup> Allum claims that the proportional representation electoral system is the most static of all and contributes to the

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<sup>16</sup> Spotts and Weiser, 15-16.

<sup>17</sup> DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing, 32-3.

<sup>18</sup> Frank Wilson, European Politics Today (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 364.



stability in voting patterns.<sup>19</sup>

Another characteristic of the Italian polity is the existence of political and social subcultures. These subcultures are deeply entrenched in the system, having originated from societal cleavages over religious divisions, regional (North-South) divisions and center-periphery tensions. Today, the three major subcultures--Catholic, Marxist and secular--have solidified the divisions of old.<sup>20</sup> They are a unifying force in Italy because of the fact that they cut across social and regional lines. Each subculture sponsors its own social, cultural, and political organizations which reach into all aspects of life in Italy. Consequently, subcultures have reinforced partisan loyalties and have contributed to the aggregate strength of the parties by inhibiting voter volatility, a problem that has been debilitating to parties outside Italy.<sup>21</sup>

LaPalombara made the astute point that the strength and stability of the Italian political system "has persisted notwithstanding a rash of conditions that in most other places would have led not only to constitutional and regime changes but also to revolution." <sup>22</sup> Probably the best recent example was Italy's handling of the massive wave of

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<sup>19</sup> Allum, 66.

<sup>20</sup> DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing, 29-31.

<sup>21</sup> Wilson, 336.

<sup>22</sup> LaPalombara, 14.

terrorism that swept across the peninsula in the 1970s and 1980s. Given the proclivity of the Government to collapse and paralyze itself under standard crises combined with the deadly attacks of the terrorists aimed directly at the overthrow of the political system, many observers felt the Republic would not survive the onslaught. After initially struggling to overcome the threat in the 1970s, the Italian police forces succeeded in the 1980s. This was adroitly accomplished without "heavy-handed counter violence" or violations of individual human rights.<sup>23</sup>

The partocracy, though omnipresent, is not omnipotent. The people are well represented and can express opinions through their parties. One member of parliament eloquently describes the relationship:

You keep talking about MPs and the electorate as if they were some sort of undifferentiated and disembodied entities floating in mid-air. But behind them is a definite reality, which is made up of parties, organizations, ideologies, historical commitments and divisions, which is the Italian reality...you ask each MP about his ideas, what he does...but these questions don't have any sense if you ignore the parties and the social classes to which we belong...It's understood that each MP feels that he has particular responsibilities towards his base and his party.<sup>24</sup>

The people may also let their voices be heard through interest groups, which are intricately tied to the parties

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 396.

<sup>24</sup> Pridham, 83.

through patronage. For example, the largest interest groups, public corporations and Catholic organizations, have established significant relationships with the partocracy, especially the DC. Ministers with functional responsibility over these organizations usually have the authority to make high-level appointments and thus an influential patronage tool. As stated previously, these organizations, in turn, place at the disposal of the party valuable financial instruments and contribute extensively to the party's coffers. When this support is focused on particular factions, they can even influence intraparty politics.<sup>25</sup> DiPalma states that clientela also ties in the interest groups and parties with the bureaucracy, thus creating a "spider web" of partisan alliances.<sup>26</sup>

Leonardi refers to this series of communications systems as linkages. He claims this linkage system provides the citizen a "short cut route" to the partocracy to relay "requirements up to the center of authority" in return for the partocracy's ever-expanding consolidation of power.<sup>27</sup>

This informal system of distribution and allocation of government resources can be highly beneficial to its

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<sup>25</sup> Dante Germino and Stefano Passigli, The Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy (NY: Harper & Row, 1968), 135.

<sup>26</sup> DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing, 5-6.

<sup>27</sup> R. Leonardi, "Political Power Linkages in Italy: The Nature of the Christian Democratic Party Organization," Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties & Linkage: A Comparative Perspective, New London, CT: Yale UP, 1980, 243-7.

recipients. This clientelism has been criticized as being a wasteful use of government funds, but it provides tangible benefits and satisfies the needs of many people. Additionally, it provides the citizenry ways to avoid, to some extent, the massive red-tape of Italy's slow and inefficient bureaucracy.<sup>28</sup>

Clientela can be found virtually anywhere. Well-placed party loyalists controlling patronage award building and highway construction contracts, grant bank loans, pensions and promotions, and distribute agricultural credits all on the basis of party preference.<sup>29</sup> A good example of how the partocracy can influence society at large through clientela is with the newspaper syndicates. Most newspapers are financially strapped. In exchange for periodic loans, arranged with a political message, the newspapers adjust the political tone of their editorials accordingly.<sup>30</sup>

### **Current Italian Governmental Structure**

Before we begin examining reforms of the Italian polity, we must first look at how the particular institutions operate. Hine and Finocchi describe Italy's structure of government as being "built on the principle

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<sup>28</sup> Wilson, 383.

<sup>29</sup> Spotts and Weiser, 6.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 143.

that power should be dispersed widely across the institutions." <sup>31</sup> With that in mind the parliament, the office of the prime minister, and the system of proportional representation will be specifically analyzed to determine what works and what does not.

Hine and Finocchi go on to say that parliament's two chambers are "elected on strictly proportional lines, are jealous of their own prerogatives, including control of procedures and timetable, and are constructed on the time-consuming principle of perfectly co-equal bicameralism." <sup>32</sup> Paul Furlong claims:

If we consider the ways in which government crises occur, it can hardly be argued to have a major role either in government crisis or in government formation; in both of these processes it is for the most part a helpless bystander, at the mercy, like the rest of the institutions, of increasingly fractious governing parties." <sup>33</sup>

He cites the government's increasing use of decree-laws (see Table 6) and instrumental votes of confidence to get legislation it wants passed as evidence of an escalating conflict between the institutions of parliament and prime minister. Moreover, the increased use of referenda, he

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<sup>31</sup> David Hine and Renato Finocchi, "The Italian Prime Minister," West European Politics, 14 (April 1991), 83.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Paul Furlong, "Parliament in Italian Politics," West European Politics, vol. 13, no. 3, July 1990, 65-6.

claims referenda, is an attempt to "wrest some influence away from the governing bodies." <sup>34</sup>

Dwayne Woods expands on this notion of 'institutional warfare':

Despite the clear demarcation between branches of government outlined in the Italian Constitution of 1947, there remains a great deal of ambiguity and conflict over institutional roles and responsibilities. From the start of the First Republic, the real source of authority and decision-making...lay outside the constitutionally mandated parliament...[where] the DC's dominant position allowed the party to determine the legislative process in ways which went beyond the 'classical notions' about the operation of parliaments.<sup>35</sup>

This can readily be seen in parliamentary committees where important pieces of legislation can be passed without ever coming before the assembled parliament for debate. This domination of parliamentary life by committees is, however, advantageous in that the various parties are "able to work out compromises free of the ideological cleavages which separated parties on the floor" and provide "a degree of political integration within an otherwise fragmented political environment." The downside to this informal system can be seen in the prolific nature of leggine, or narrow legislation, which is produced as a result of meeting

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Dwayne Woods, "The Center No Longer Holds: The Rise of Regional Leagues in Italian Politics," West European Politics, 15 (April 1992), 63-4.

the "demands of the clientele of political parties." <sup>36</sup>

Furlong believes that parliament is not in decline, but that there exists a "constitutional impasse in which government and parliament have been unable to develop a stable and effective working relationship precisely because of the interaction between an unreformed public administration, a loosely worded constitution, and unbalanced party-political development." <sup>37</sup> The institution of the prime minister is engaged in a political war on many fronts concerning its authority and influence. The constraints on its power range from its relationship with other institutions to the country's fractious party system.<sup>38</sup>

Spotts and Weiser note that contrary to developments in most other European democracies, the power of the executive branch in Italy has remained minimal; the prime minister and his cabinet have not become the "institutional foci" of the political system. Instead, they say, "the parliament's debility is matched by the government's weakness." <sup>39</sup>

Hine and Finocchi delineate some reasons for what they also see as a structurally weak institution. They say that the particularly complex and fragmented nature of the DC is

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<sup>36</sup> Woods, 63-4.

<sup>37</sup> Furlong, 55.

<sup>38</sup> Hine and Finocchi, 79.

<sup>39</sup> Spotts and Weiser, 115.

the greatest detriment to the authority of the prime minister:

Internal party conflict drastically weakens the authority of the party leadership...when the DC is divided into a series of competing factions, there is no identifiable group which can claim to represent the interests of the 'party as a whole'...Factions think of themselves as 'occupying' institutional space rather than cooperating as a team.<sup>40</sup>

Dwayne Woods concurs that the factional conflicts within the DC party and the strife among coalition partners take away any possible policy-making authority from the prime minister. In effect, the government "lacks any steering capacity in the political system." He feels that the Italian political system is "neither a parliamentary nor executive driven system," but one where the political parties "are at the heart of the legislative and executive processes." <sup>41</sup>

LaPalombara, however, says that the prime minister's constitutional powers are broad and flexible enough to allow for a maximum of initiative and leadership. He lists several institutions that are directly responsible to the prime minister or subject to his influence, to include the Court of Accounts, the Council of State, regional administration tribunals, the attorney general, the superior

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<sup>40</sup> Hine and Finocchi, 85-6.

<sup>41</sup> Woods, 65.



council for public administration, and all cabinet ministers without portfolio. He points to the tenure of Bettino Craxi (1983-87) as a prime example of what a strong leader can accomplish in a "weak" office. He explains Craxi's success in those years by postulating that "the trick is to understand the nature of existing institutions and to turn them to your needs and purposes." <sup>42</sup>

Craxi did, in fact, lead from the front on many policy issues by forthrightly stating his position on those issues, then holding himself directly accountable to the electorate. In this way, Craxi could claim that by establishing a "direct rapport with electoral opinion" his coalition partners would be hard pressed to force his ouster in the event of a policy dispute.<sup>43</sup> Although acknowledging Craxi's longevity in office as a major achievement, Hine and Finocchi emphasize two other factors that were influential in his self-purported success on policy matters: coming from outside the DC ranks and the major scandals involving DC politicians in the early 1980s. They claim that since Craxi "represented a discrete party rather than a faction of the DC, and thus could be identified by voters as a separate actor in the coalition from those who sought to bring him down, he had greater political strength than a faction

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<sup>42</sup> LaPalombara, 249.

<sup>43</sup> Hine and Finocchi, 88.

leader in the DC would have had." <sup>44</sup> Moreover, the scandals resulted in the lowest percentage of the vote ever won by the DC to that point.

It should be no surprise to note that Prime Minister Amato has adopted much the same strategy as his party secretary Craxi. From the outset of his term in 1992 Amato has laid out specific economic policies to spur Italy's lagging economy. These policies involve major cuts in state spending, affecting such controversial areas as pensions, health care, and subsidies to public sector corporations. Craxi's historical precedent is repeating itself as Amato, a Socialist starting his term on the heels of the greatest DC defeat ever, has challenged his coalition partners to accept his tough proposals or remove him.

The Italian political system is based on proportional representation. Although proportional representation has been much maligned as the root cause of many of Italy's problems, it should be thought of as a "basic element in the democratization of Italy." Proportional representation has, of course, contributed to Italy's pluralistic politics. But Paolo Farneti points out how Mussolini was able to effect a totalitarian regime when he used an electoral law which negated the pluralistic effects of the proportional

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<sup>44</sup> Hine and Finocchi, 87-8.

representation system.<sup>45</sup> Additionally, pluralism sufficiently reflects the wide range of political opinion of the citizenry. On the other hand, critics of Italy's proportional representation system claim that it "provides excessive guarantees to minority groups which in turn permits the political scene to be over-fragmented and obliges governments to be formed from coalitions." <sup>46</sup> The results of the 1992 parliamentary elections illustrates this claim--the new parliament includes a total of sixteen parties of which twelve each garnered less than seven percent of the total vote and only one (DC) more than twenty percent.

#### **Some Proposed Reforms**

Calls for reform by Italy's leading industrialists have pointed out the government's inability to act decisively, the uncertainty of leadership, and an excess of interference by the parties. They have recommended a wide variety of changes but have failed to reach a consensus on the best and most urgent method of reform.<sup>47</sup> Among politicians, too,

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<sup>45</sup> Paolo Farneti, The Italian Party System 1945-80, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 48.

<sup>46</sup> "Protest vote may spur action," Financial Times, 7 July 1992, 3.

<sup>47</sup> Renzo Rosati, "Purch  non sia all'italiana," Panorama, 14 April 1991, 38-9.

there exists little agreement. Major reform proposals have varied widely, but most center around giving voters more of a choice, helping to achieve some sort of alternation in government, and empowering the executive branch.

The Christian Democrats are in favor of establishing a minimum floor in parliamentary elections and strengthening the government. The former would encourage smaller parties to form coalitions which, as I will cover shortly, would be positioned to oppose other coalitions to allow the voters to choose. To effect the latter, the DC is calling for a 'majority premium' to be awarded to the party, or the pre-electoral coalition, which wins the most votes. The additional seats would, in effect, give the main party or coalition a stable majority. Moreover, if the coalition was designated prior to the election the voters would finally be allowed to choose an alternative government.<sup>48</sup>

The Socialists concur with the Christian Democrats on the need for a minimum floor like the Germans have in their Bundestag. But they want to strengthen the government by transferring some power from the parliament to the prime minister by enabling the latter to propose legislation, much like the British prime minister. The PSI is also calling for a popularly-elected president, which it feels would have a polarizing effect across the electorate and therefore help

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<sup>48</sup> "Una repubblica in sei proposte," Panorama, 14 April 1991, 40-1.

to create a two-bloc system where alternation could be achieved.<sup>49</sup> Much of the motivation for the two proposals designed to strengthen the executive seems to be coming from the Bettino Craxi, who was known for an autocratic, forceful style of leadership (decisionismo) as prime minister in the 1980s.

The Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) wants to reduce parliament to one chamber and change the electoral system to a single-member constituency, like the British, with two voting rounds, like the French. Gianfranco Pasquino says that the party's intent with these reform proposals is to create a "strong parliament in which a disciplined party such as the [PDS] could play a greater role, capitalizing on the dissatisfaction of voters with the large 'political class'." <sup>50</sup>

DC-rebel Mario Segni and a host of other Christian Democrat deputies have initiated a bill which would institute a run-off majority system and whose primary purpose is to render the partitocrazia impotent. Segni believes that this system "will produce a competition among candidates, and the winning candidate will present and presumably respond to the needs of the entire

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Gianfranco Pasquino, "That Obscure Object of Desire: A New Electoral Law," West European Politics, 12 (July 1989), 285.

constituency." <sup>51</sup>

The minor parties also remain far apart on the subject of reform, banding together only to oppose the minimum floor reform since this would most likely shut them out of parliament. In fact, had a five percent threshold been applied to the 1992 parliamentary elections, seven parties winning a total of 100 seats in the lower chamber would have been excluded.

### Conclusion

Pasquino notes that, with the exception of the Fifth French Republic, there has never been a case of a state changing from proportional representation back to a majority system; and thus, it is not surprising that after more than a decade of seemingly serious debate, there is little consensus on the direction the reform movement should take. Although specific reforms vary with every party, Pasquino states that there has been some agreement:

Agreement has been reached that in order to strengthen Italian governments, one must also strengthen the Italian parliament and that this implies a different electoral system. Agreement has also been reached that it would be unwise to make parliamentary representation easier.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 288-9.

<sup>52</sup> Pasquino, 291-2.

Pasquino concludes by proposing a double-ballot system similar to France's which would give the electorate the opportunity to choose a government with minimal interference from the parties and would represent the broad spectrum of interests of the voters. He explains:

In the first round of voting, voters would choose a certain number of parliamentary representatives (400) in 40 constituencies according to the d'Hondt formula. In the second round...voters would choose among competing coalitions. The winning coalition would receive 75 seats and the losing one 25. In order to get the bonus of seats, a coalition would have to present a program and a prime minister, and receive at least 40 percent of the national vote.<sup>53</sup>

His proposal, in essence, combines a form of proportional representation with a 'majority premium' which he feels should solve the problems associated with the fragmentation of the party system and allow for alternation in power. Governments would be "obliged to be stable and efficient, and the opposition to be inquisitive, alert, and to supply alternatives." <sup>54</sup>

LaPalombara takes a much more pessimistic point of view towards these reform proposals and the reform debate in general. He believes it is "wishful thinking that new written rules, even constitutional ones, can bring back 'into parliament' a political process that takes place on

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<sup>53</sup> Pasquino, 287.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

'the outside'." <sup>55</sup> While he agrees that some reforms are indeed necessary and others overdue, he feels most will never come to fruition. What is even of greater interest in light of the historical victory of the Lega Lombarda and defeat of the DC is his comment on potential institutional reform:

A real threat to the present republic might well occur were a momentum for sweeping changes to take hold. It would lead, in my view, to a substantial crisis precisely because so many of the suggested changes are imports from elsewhere, where they may or may not work as the reformers believe. If these institutional rules and processes are not entirely alien to Italian culture, they would certainly not fit the pattern of democratic government that has evolved in the past four decades.<sup>56</sup>

Above all, it is important to assess how far, if at all, it is feasible to radically alter Italy's political institutions by purely legal/constitutional means, in the absence of more fundamental changes in the underlying political conditions.

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<sup>55</sup> LaPalombara, 245.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 257.



### CHAPTER THREE

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#### Regional Determinants for Institutional Reform

The southern regioni of Italy are collectively known as the Mezzogiorno, or land of the midday sun (Fig. 1). The dualism that exists between the northern and southern regioni is such that there appear to be two separate and distinct nations on the Italian peninsula. The disparities began in the Middle Ages and have increasingly widened since. This dualism is a result of historical, physical, cultural, and political differences between the two. This chapter will focus on the socio-economic differences in the context of the role the Mezzogiorno plays in Italian politics.

Despite a second economic miracle in the 1980s that propelled Italy to number five in the world economic rankings, there still remain serious economic deficiencies




Figure 1: The seven provinces of the Mezzogiorno

which could prove to be very painful for Italy in the 1990s. As a result of the Maastricht Summit in December 1991, the European Economic Community (EEC) established convergence criteria for those members desiring admittance to the monetary union in 1997. Italy, thus far, meets only one of the criteria (currency); it has a long way to go before the massive budget deficit (9.9%) and public debt (101%) are reduced enough to meet EC standards (3% and 60% respectively). As such, Italy is in danger of being excluded from the "fast track" members and full participation in EMU. The socio-economic debility of the South has drained the Italian economy and exacerbated these fiscal problems. Thus, la questione meridionale is no longer peculiarly Southern in nature--it now affects all Italians.

As was addressed in Chapter Two, there have been many varied propositions for institutional reform in response to this urgent situation. In addition to the reforms of the institutions of the prime minister, parliament, and proportional representation, there have been calls to reform Italy's intergovernmental relations.

Although regional autonomy was provided for in the Italian Constitution, the country's twenty regioni today enjoy only limited authority. Keating describes it as a

"minimalist" form of regional government.<sup>1</sup> Italian political parties have, thus far, successfully inhibited significant expansion of regional autonomy in the quest to maintain their power base. What is the likelihood of Italy's political actors reaching a consensus on regional reform? To answer this question, I will first describe the EC's and Italy's efforts to achieve regional equilibrium through their regional policies. After describing the economic situation in Italy and what makes the Mezzogiorno different from other underdeveloped regions in Europe, I will cover some underlying causes of the disparity. Finally, I will examine the prospects for change. In doing so I will try to show how socio-economic-political factors in Italy, and in the Mezzogiorno in particular, are such that greater regional reforms are possible, although perhaps not necessarily the best prescription for the Mezzogiorno's ills.

### **EEC Regional Policy**

The rationale for the EC's redistribution policies (i.e., social and regional policies) is to reduce the disparities caused by the dynamism of the EC's integrated markets (Fig. 2). The impetus to correct these regional

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Keating, "Does Regional Government Work? The Experience of Italy, France and Spain," Governance, 1 (April 1988), 188.

inequalities started during the 1972 Conference of the European Council in Paris with the formation of a Regional Fund. Since the enactment of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, EC members have been bound by treaty to honor the concept of redistribution.<sup>2</sup>

The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is the primary means by which the Community intervenes to help with regional




Figure 2: Relative wealth reflecting regional disparities

disparities. It makes grants available at the request of members, in practice partially reimbursing them for their own regional expenditure. The purpose of the Fund is to "stimulate investment in economic activities and develop the

<sup>2</sup> William Molle, The Economics of European Integration (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1990), 417-18.

infrastructure" in those regions determined by the EC to be problem areas.<sup>3</sup> EC regional policy is designed to complement the national regional policies of its members. Italy, for example, has been trying to close the gap for some time now with its own program.

### Italian Regional Policy

Italy's regional policy has evolved over the years in the effort to achieve socio-economic equilibrium. I will focus on the government's principal tool in its fight against disequilibria, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, or Southern Development Fund. The Cassa, founded in 1950, was established to enable the government to rapidly intervene and assist the South with its problems. The assumption was that the primary obstacles to development in the Mezzogiorno were a small market and poor infrastructure. Butalia explains that "state funds were intended to improve the infrastructure...and to reduce the additional costs that private investors would have to face if they invested in the South rather than the North, and to permit self-generating industrial growth."<sup>4</sup> The government then tried to speed industrialization by mandating investment parameters to

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<sup>3</sup> William Molle, The Economics of European Integration (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1990), 426-7.

<sup>4</sup> Butalia, 45.


state firms, i.e. 60 percent of an enterprise's total investments and 80 percent of their new investments were to be made in the Mezzogiorno. This had significant potential because the government controlled several large state holding companies. The program was successful in that it raised the percentage of industrial investment in the South from 15 percent of the national total in the 1950s to 30 percent in the 1970s. But since these massive state enterprises (e.g. ENI, IRI) dealt mainly in heavy industry, i.e., iron and steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering, cement, and petrochemicals, their increased investments were primarily in capital-intensive sectors which do not equate to many more job opportunities. As I will discuss further in the next section, these types of investments also do not generate development of industries producing lighter consumer goods which are necessary for balanced growth.<sup>5</sup>

In the late 1960s, Italian authorities initiated a plan which was to stimulate faster growth for the whole of the Mezzogiorno. The strategy was to concentrate on a developed infrastructure, a network of interdependent industries, and a trained labor supply in a relatively small area in order to achieve economies of scale and make investment into these areas more attractive. The government initially established 42 of these nuclei. In some parts of the South the nuclei

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<sup>5</sup> J. Harrop, The Political Economics of Integration in the European Community (Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1989), 105-6.

were closely linked with each other and subsequently became known as "growth poles" (Fig. 3).



Investors **Figure 3: Growth poles in the Mezzogiorno**

have poured most of their lire into these growth poles, the most important being the Naples-Salerno pole, the Bari-Brindisi-Taranto triangle, and the Siracusa-Augusta pole.<sup>6</sup>

The emphasis shifted in the 1980s to small and medium-sized firms in the effort to stimulate growth. The Cassa was terminated in 1984 and replaced by the Agenzia per la Promozione dello Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno. After 30 years and \$20 billion the results of the program are undramatic. Income levels have been raised and the standard of living for the majority of Southerners has improved, but as I will discuss next, the socio-economic disparity between North and

<sup>6</sup> G.N. Minshull, The New Europe: An Economic Geography of the EEC (NY: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 261-2.



South remains essentially unchanged from 1950.<sup>7</sup> I will describe the nature of the disparity problem in Italy today and determine why it has occurred.

### **Economic Conditions in the Mezzogiorno**

Even before Giuseppe Garibaldi and his "thousand" swept through Sicily and up the peninsula completing the unification of the Italian nation-state in 1861, the Italian South had been conquered and exploited on countless occasions by outside forces. The new national government was looked upon as just another foreign power and a deep resentment and mistrust followed. After the central government removed internal tariffs, the South was unable to compete with the more efficient North and became poorer almost overnight.<sup>8</sup> This regional socio-economic difference has existed ever since. It is true that regional disparities exist in all nations, but Italy's is unique in the "depth of the division and the breadth of its causes."<sup>9</sup> The problem, simply stated, is one of limited economic resources and development for an overpopulated area. It has

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<sup>7</sup> Hugh Clout, Regional Variations in the European Community (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1986), 52-3.

<sup>8</sup> Dante Germino and Stefano Passigli, The Government and Politics of Contemporary Italy (NY: Harper & Row, 1968), unk.

<sup>9</sup> Fred Spotts and T. Weiser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1986), 232.

been characterized by poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, poor health, and high infant mortality. These factors and others have inhibited the Mezzogiorno from establishing its own independent industrial structure and thus assurance of continued and increased employment opportunities.<sup>10</sup>

Thanks to EC and Italian regional policies, there has been no shortage of direct investment in the Mezzogiorno. Short term employment and value-added has been substantial in sectors such as steel, petrochemicals, and large-scale engineering (e.g. vehicles). But, as Graziani asserts, these enterprises have "remained isolated from the surrounding regional economy [with the] sources of supply mainly in the center and the north and the ownership of these enterprises [lying] outside the Mezzogiorno with public or private groups whose main base and roots are in the north." <sup>11</sup> Moreover, the entrepreneurial structure of these firms was such that their only goal was to raise productivity to the exclusion of "stimulating external activities." <sup>12</sup> Thus the creation of the so-called 'cathedrals in the desert,' where large, new factory complexes stand tall and proud in contrast to the

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<sup>10</sup> Liana Milella, "Alarm Signals from the South," Italian Journal, vol. 3, no. 5, 1989, 15.

<sup>11</sup> Augusto Graziani, "The Mezzogiorno in the Italian Economy," Jo Bradley, ed., Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2 (December 1978), 369.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

surrounding poverty. Two good examples involve automobile manufacturing sites. The Alfa-Sud plant was projected to stimulate local subcontracting and lead to an additional 45,000 jobs in supplementary fields, but only a few thousand have been generated by local firms to support the assembly works. Likewise, FIAT's southern plant receives direct support from its parent and other subcontractors in the north rather than from firms indigenous to the south.<sup>13</sup>

In terms of almost all the standard indicators of regional disequilibrium--per capita income, unemployment rates, migration--the Mezzogiorno constitutes a serious regional problem. The percentage of the South's income per capita to the Center-North's in 1951 was 54 percent; in 1971, 62.3 percent; and in 1985, 60.3 percent (see Table 7). The South's unemployment rates have soared to three times those of the North's:

Regional and Gender Distribution of Unemployment<sup>14</sup>  
 (% of relevant labor force in January 1991)

Region	Male		Female		Total	
	1990	1991	1990	1991	1990	1991
Center-North	4.3	3.9	12.1	10.7	7.3	6.6
South	15.4	15.1	32.6	32.0	21.2	20.7

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<sup>13</sup> Clout, 52.

<sup>14</sup> EIU Country Report: Italy, no. 3, September 1991, 21.

Emigration, although somewhat subsiding of late, remains grossly unbalanced in favor of the Mezzogiorno (see Tables 8 and 9). To more fully illustrate the plight of the South, we can look at the EC Commission's periodic Synthetic Index which rank orders regions according to the severity of their socio-economic problems (see Table 10). The index is a composite figure based upon the following factors: GDP per capita, GDP per person employed, unemployment, and prospective labor force change for the upcoming year. Table 10 shows that seven out of the eight regioni comprising the Mezzogiorno are in the top twenty EC-wide.<sup>15</sup>

Italy's Confindustria Study Center publishes its own "synthetic index of development" to define and measure quality of life among the nation's regions and provinces (see Table 11). The center bases its rankings on per capita GDP, rate of industrialization, rate of unemployment, individual savings deposits, coefficient of motorization, and domestic energy consumption. Not surprisingly, those same areas of the Mezzogiorno were again at the very bottom in 1990.<sup>16</sup>

Despite this seemingly overly-pessimistic description of the economic condition of the Mezzogiorno, there is room

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<sup>15</sup> Colin Mellors and N. Copperthwaite, Regional Policy (London: Routledge, 1990), 33.

<sup>16</sup> Paolo Guglielmetti and Giuseppe Rosa, "Il mezzogiorno tra squilibri e segnali di vitalita'," Rivista di politica economica, series III, no. 2, February 1992, 97-8.

for hope. The abject poverty of the post-war years has virtually disappeared. Illiteracy is on its way to a similar fate. With overall income increased substantially, personal health and life expectancy in the South has improved as well. Infant mortality has dropped by two-thirds. A promising batch of young entrepreneurs has arisen in the South and has initiated genuine industrialization in the area between Rome and Naples, along the coast from Pescara to Bari, and in the southern Marches. Spotts and Wieser say that "in most ways Italians are [now] more closely knit than they have been in over a 1000 years." <sup>17</sup>

#### **Some Causal Factors**

With the large amounts of capital flowing into the Mezzogiorno its underdevelopment could also be considered 'growth without development.' Carello advances an interesting theory that this type of destructive investment has been the brain-child of the Northwest Elite, the wealthy industrialists of northwestern Italy where the center of economic strength in Italy is located. This situation was brought on by the exigencies of international economic

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<sup>17</sup> Spotts and Wieser, 237-8.

competition, namely EEC integration:

...the EEC's unbalanced integration induced the Northwest Elite to protect its privileged position in Italy by minimizing the negative consequences of the country's participation in the EEC for the economic system of the Northwest. To this end, the Northwest Elite intensified the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment. It increased the Mezzogiorno's involvement in the process of capital accumulation in the Italian economy to the advantage and benefit of the economic system of the Northwest by implementing the policies of incentives and dependent industrialization. Under these policies, the Mezzogiorno's development depends not upon the accumulation and the investment...of the real income produced by the Mezzogiorno but rather upon the infusion of external resources, the capital intensive Italian and foreign investments that cause the Mezzogiorno's economic development without employment.<sup>18</sup>

The distribution of Italy's Common Regional Fund lends credence to this assertion (see Table 12). The very purpose of this fund is to balance regional economic disparities, and yet the richer regioni of the Northwest receive a much greater percentage than those of the destitute South. Even the much better off regioni of the Center/Northeast take a larger share of the fund.<sup>19</sup>

Clientela, or patronage system, has been another major factor in maintaining the South's depressed economic conditions. An old Sicilian proverb describes the situation well:

"Chi mi da' il pane mi da' la vita."<sup>20</sup>  
(He who gives me bread gives me life.)

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<sup>18</sup> A.N. Carello, The Northern Question (Newark, NJ: U of Delaware Press, 1989), 136-7.

<sup>19</sup> Carello, 136-7.

<sup>20</sup> Judith Chubb, The Mafia and Politics: The Italian State Under Siege (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1989), 91.

The national government has been progressively expanding its role in local southern politics since the end of World War II. The Italian political party system, and the Christian Democratic Party (DC) in particular, has been able to spread itself over a number of institutions that are normally controlled by private interests. Continued DC hegemony in national and local southern politics since the war has enabled them to secure access to state resources and make them available to local partisan politicians. The DC has thus been able to monopolize economic resources in the South. Without its own independent resource base, the South has become highly dependent on those provided by the government. According to Chubb, this monopoly of resources by the DC is influenced by the "manipulation of scarcity." That is, the greater the competition for scarce resources, which are held solely by one element, the greater the dependence on that element. So we can see why there would be little desire on the part of the DC to foster investment growth. In fact, true economic development is one of the greatest threats to DC supremacy in the South. It would provide Southerners with alternative resources without the strings attached, thus enabling the Mezzogiorno to cast off its yoke of dependence.<sup>21</sup>

The dependence of all regioni upon the central government is intensified by the absence of any genuine

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 215-16.

regional powers. But Dante Germino believes that the Constitution was written "as a step, if not clearly in the direction of federalism, at least away from the centralized, unitary state of the French type that had formerly prevailed in Italy."<sup>22</sup> Article 115 of the Constitution established the regions as "autonomous bodies with their own powers and functions." Article 131 declared there were to be nineteen of these entities, of which five were to have "particular forms and conditions of autonomy" for ethnic or geographic reasons.<sup>23</sup> In 1972, Rome finally established regional governments with their own elected councils and authority over local matters as called for by the Constitution. Nevertheless, states Hansen, the limitations and close supervision exerted by the central government are such that the regions are not even close to being autonomous.<sup>24</sup> For example, regions may exercise only limited taxing authority. Since the revenue from these taxes comprise only four percent of their budgets, the regioni are highly dependent upon the central government for the bulk of its income. Moreover, Rome dictates to the regions what the majority of these funds are to be used for i.e., regional governments have spending discretion over only 30 percent of their

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<sup>22</sup> Germino and Passigli, 57-8.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Niles Hansen, "The New Regionalism and European Economic Integration," Regional Development, G. Demko, ed. (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 70.



income.<sup>25</sup>

A look at the cabinet illustrates the hegemony of the Christian Democrats. Prior to the 1992 national Parliamentary elections, the DC held 17 of the 32 cabinet positions with the other members of the coalition--PSI, PSDI, and PLI--splitting the remainder. Of particular note was the DC's continual holding of those Ministries that directly impact on the economic conditions of the South through the use of patronage, i.e. the Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, and the Mezzogiorno. Despite losing five percentage points of the vote in the 1992 elections, the DC again secured a majority (11 of 21 ministries) in a smaller cabinet. Interestingly, they managed to increase their share of the electorate in the Mezzogiorno despite large losses in the northern and central regions (see Table 2).

Organized crime and political collusion comprise the third major factor keeping the South from improving its lot. Although the Sicilian Mafia is the best known, there are two other powerful gangs that have influenced life in the South: the Naples-based Camorra and the Calabria-based 'Ndrangheta. These organized crime syndicates have stifled economic growth by scaring off businessmen. Their modus operandi is to demand protection money from factories and farms, then wreak havoc on these businesses if they do not comply.

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<sup>25</sup> Keating, "Does Regional Government Work?", 196.

Extortion and murder are most prevalent in the home regioni of the syndicates (see Table 13). According to the 1992 report of the Rome-based Association for Industrial Development of the Mezzogiorno (Svimez), 70 percent of the murders and 68 percent of the serious robberies in 1991 occurred in Calabria, Campania, Sicily, and Puglia.<sup>26</sup> It follows, then, that economic underdevelopment is perhaps the worst in these four regioni. In contrast, the southern regioni of Molise and Basilicata have demonstrated how "progress can be achieved in equally poor areas which are free from the Mafia and its mainland cousins." Economic growth in these two areas has been among the fastest in the nation.<sup>27</sup>

What makes these criminals so entrenched is the fact that the Mafia, 'Ndrangheta, and Camorra are intricately tied to local and even national political leaders. These politicians, mostly from the DC, "agree to protect from legal prosecution... those mafiosi who agree to supply votes for elections by organizing consensus through favoritism and intimidation."<sup>28</sup> This assertion has gained creditability of late--the 1992 murders of leading anti-Mafia magistrates, Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, have underscored the

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<sup>26</sup> "Aumentano i delitti di lupara," Corriere della Sera, 3 July 1992, 6.

<sup>27</sup> "The Mending of the Mezzogiorno," The Economist, August 16, 1986, 31.

<sup>28</sup> Carello, 133.

pervasive powers of organized crime. On the surface, the government appears powerless to protect its prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel. In the case of Judge Falcone's assassination, there have been insinuations of government complicity--Falcone was supposedly on a top secret flight from Rome to Palermo, immediately after which the deadly attack took place on the autostrada outside the Palermo airport.

Moreover, Chubb claims that there has been a change in the public opinion of the Mafia to one of support. Although seemingly dubious at first glance, this situation has been made possible by the Mafia's ability to provide for the basic needs of the people vis-a-vis the inefficient state. As the southern economy has worsened, the Mafia has become even more critical to certain sectors of the economy who "have become dependent upon investment and employment produced by the Mafia." <sup>29</sup>

The national government has unwittingly facilitated this dependence on organized crime. In the late 1970s the government changed its spending policy in the South from one concentrated on infrastructure and industrial development to one focusing on direct assistance to the people through disability, unemployment, and pension payments. Additionally, national wage negotiations replaced regional-based ones. With these two changes, young Southerners have

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<sup>29</sup> Chubb, 39.

less incentive to migrate north in search of work, where Italy's prosperous Industrial Triangle is located.<sup>30</sup> The North's economic 'pull' factor and the South's rural 'push' factor used to be so strong that by the beginning of the 1970s, Torino had grown to become the third largest "southern" city in Italy, after Naples and Palermo.<sup>31</sup>

This situation has exacerbated the already atrociously high unemployment rate among the youth, and the Mafia has made ample use of this ready pool of anxious soldiers to carry out their necessary tasks. Another side effect of the move to national wage negotiations was, of course, that it pushed up labor costs. Increased costs plus the Mafia, says Flavia Salerno, chief spokesperson for Italy's Agency for the Promotion of Development in the Mezzogiorno, have convinced most companies that it is not "worth setting up shop in the South." <sup>32</sup>

### Prospects for Change

Come 1992 and beyond, will Italy still be a legitimate member of an expanding EEC or part of a more depressed Mediterranean area? This will depend greatly on if and how it will deal with its oldest and most serious social and economic problem--the underdeveloped South. <sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Christian Science Monitor, March 1991, 3.

<sup>31</sup> Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-88 (London: Penguin, 1990), 220.

<sup>32</sup> Christian Science Monitor, 3.

<sup>33</sup> G. DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing (Berkeley, CA: Univ of California Press, 1977), xiv.

Italy undoubtedly would be in much better financial condition without the Mezzogiorno. The country's present-day economic woes--massive public debt, expanding trade deficit, and high inflation and interest rates--have been exacerbated by the socio-economic conditions in the Mezzogiorno. The South imports goods and services to a much larger extent than does the North, but can claim only eight percent of Italy's manufactured goods.<sup>34</sup> As the government continues to pour capital into the South, the public debt worsens. A solution to the problem has become more urgent than ever. Leading industrialist and chief executive of FIAT, Gianni Agnelli, presents the situation clearly:

The EEC's successive enlargement has robbed Southern Italy of its hardly enviable distinction of being the only depressed area in Europe...other areas--in Ireland, Scotland, France-- have been added to the list. And the list is destined to be further expanded once the agreements which provide for admission of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and perhaps even Turkey, become operative. The political and institutional horizon is thus changing. This does not mean that the battle for foreign investments has been surrendered: indeed, it is being stepped up...there is increasing need for the steadily diminishing stream of industrial capital.<sup>35</sup>

Additionally, the end of 1992 and the single internal market draws near. With this opening of the market for services and acceleration of the "existing flows of trade," Harrop predicts that the regional imbalance in Italy will undoubtedly intensify unless something is done about the

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<sup>34</sup> Christian Science Monitor, 3.

<sup>35</sup> Agnelli, 16.

major factors contributing to the Mezzogiorno's underdevelopment.<sup>36</sup> Will Italy be able to attenuate the influences of the Northwest Elite, the DC and clientela, and organized crime? Will additional regional reforms affect these factors? These questions must be answered in the affirmative if the South hopes to close the gap. Evidence of improving conditions in the South notwithstanding, the national government still finds it difficult to eliminate or even reduce the disparities between the 'two Italies.' Carello maintains that Italy could overcome its regional problems if they formed an EC southern bloc "capable of shifting the balance of power from northern Europe toward the Mediterranean area." Only by this will they be able to realize greater political autonomy from the dominating powers in the EC--Germany and France--and be able to achieve "a more balanced territorial development of the national economy." <sup>37</sup>

Northern exploitation can only be arrested if the South creates their own autonomous centers of economic power independent of the firms of the Northwest Elite. From here, southern companies can establish increasing employment opportunities for Southerners over the long run. For all this to happen, however, large amounts of capital will be needed. If not from the northern Italian industrialists,

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<sup>36</sup> Harrop, 110.

<sup>37</sup> Carello, 140.

then from whom? Svimez recommends "European sources able to establish a healthy and competitive industrial matrix." <sup>38</sup>

One of the main reasons why the government is finding it so difficult to solve the 'southern problem' is the political party system in Italy. The partocracy has a hand in virtually every facet of Italian society. The economy is included under the partocracy's power umbrella and so its reform would have to be at the behest of the parties. This is where the regionalists, those demanding regional autonomy, have advocated taking away much of the political and economic authority of the center as the only effective way for Italy to solve its socio-economic-political problems caused by the partocracy. Woods claims that "as long as Rome remains the center, the crisis of representation and legitimacy that Italians feel will continue." <sup>39</sup> Pro-reformists discover their proposals get stalled in committees. Those that are passed by Parliament are undermined by the bureaucracy, which is closely cooperating with the wishes of the partocracy.<sup>40</sup>

Since reform would mean a loss of political power for the partocracy, they are naturally hesitant. This is especially true for the DC, who is the most entrenched in

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<sup>38</sup> Milella, 15-16.

<sup>39</sup> Woods, 61.

<sup>40</sup> Joseph LaPalombara, Democracy: Italian Style (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1987), 24.

the South and who, therefore, has the most to lose among the parties. As the DC's hegemony on the national and southern region levels continues, the Christian Democrats maximize their political power to gain more and thus perpetuate their reign. Since they are currently in the preeminent position, they favor the status quo.<sup>41</sup>

Despite the fact that the Italian Constitution provides for regional autonomy, the central government has devolved only a few token powers to the periphery, and then only after 25 years of bureaucratic resistance. The regioni have limited taxing authority, for example. Since the revenue from these taxes comprise less than ten percent of its budget, the regione is highly dependent upon the central government for the bulk of its income. Additionally, Rome dictates to the regioni what the majority of these funds are to be used for. Regional governments have spending discretion over less than a third of their income.<sup>42</sup>

Politicians have proposed a broad range of institutional reforms that would empower the regions. All the proposals aim to give the regions more autonomy from Rome. As we will see in the next chapter, Umberto Bossi and his Lega Lombarda have called for the most drastic measures--the division of the country into three sub-republics, each having its own government, parliament, and spending

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 231.

<sup>42</sup> Spotts and Wieser, 227.



discretion over its tax income. The PSI has instead proposed to extend to all regions those special statutes currently enjoyed by only five of Italy's regions. The PDS would like to see regional reform include the direct election of the president of each regional junta.<sup>43</sup> The DC is unlikely to support any moves toward changing this system since that would decrease the effectiveness of the patronage tool. The whole system of clientela is based upon the South's dependence on the assets of the partocracy. Clark proposes that the introduction of the regional tier in the Italian political structure is yet another example of gattopardismo, or changes initiated so that everything else may remain the same.<sup>44</sup> Agnew, however, feels that this claim "ignores the diffuse nature of the existing regime, in particular the importance to it of ambiguity and negotiated order."<sup>45</sup> In any case, Italy's new prime minister, Giuliano Amato, seems determined to effect reforms that would diminish the strength of the South's economic dependency on the center. He has proposed that local governments be given the authority to raise additional

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<sup>43</sup> "Una repubblica in sei proposte," Panorama, 14 April 1991, 41.

<sup>44</sup> Martin Clark, "Italy: Regionalism and Bureaucratic Reform," J. Cornford, ed., The Failure of the State (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 71.

<sup>45</sup> John Agnew, "Political Decentralization and Urban Policy in Italy," Policy Studies Journal, 13(Spring 1990), 771.

property tax (one lira per 1,000 on a house), income tax (commencing at one percent above national rates, increasing to four percent by 1994), and road taxes.<sup>46</sup> Whether these proposals survive the dynamics of Italian politics is not so clear.

The likelihood of ridding the Mezzogiorno of the criminal gangs to help facilitate southern development is difficult to determine. As stated previously, these entrepreneurial criminals are backed by a supportive public consensus and are intricately tied to the political parties, in particular the DC. With growing unemployment, the Mafia can easily find willing and able participants. For an anti-organized crime campaign to be successful, it would take an all-out, sincere effort on the part of the government. This includes, of course, the cooperation of all political parties. Certainly the government has the ability to conduct such a campaign; one only needs to look at how terrorism, a much greater threat to the state, was defeated in the late 1970s once the parties agreed to a plan. The only question remains, are the parties willing? The Amato Government has already been successful in getting some tough, anti-crime legislation through Parliament reminiscent of the anti-terrorist laws of the 1970s and has deployed 7000 of their best-trained troops to Sicily to help restore

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<sup>46</sup> "Dr. Subtle's twin pillars," Financial Times, 16 July 1992, 12.

order in a massive show of force. It remains to be seen whether the Government will be strong enough to carry out a thorough purging of the political ranks of any collusion in order to eliminate this latest threat to the state.

With more forces working against development of the South than working for it, it appears as though improvement is unlikely. The northern industrialists, Italian political parties, and organized crime syndicates all have interests in maintaining the status quo. All three have benefitted from the South's depressed economic condition. The overall standard of living has improved for those living in the Mezzogiorno, but the disparity in wealth between the North and the South remains and in some respects is increasing. The North-South disparity is unlikely to be dramatically altered. The possibility exists, however, that with the single market in 1993, the economic sting of the Mezzogiorno's debility will be so great as to convince the politicians and industrialists to effect genuine change. Furthermore, the massive shift in voter preference in the 1992 parliamentary elections has significantly illustrated people's changing attitude toward the central government. The biggest winners in the elections, for instance, were parties which ran on platforms calling for political reform--Lega Lombarda and La Rete. Both party's agendas would seriously diminish DC power in the South. Moreover, Tarrow postulates, regions are beginning to flourish:

...the regions...function, they attract the interest--if not the loyalty--of the citizens, and they have begun to take on definite institutional personalities which differ from region to region and vary according to the political coloration of their majorities...this reflection of the differing socio-cultural realities of Italy's regions means simply that the regions are taking hold, and appears far more promising for institutional innovation than a type of decentralization--like that of France for example--that is both uniform and empty of content.<sup>47</sup>

Leonardi, Nanetti, and Putnam also point out although the "center still has a predominant role to play in intergovernmental relations...the nature of the relationship has changed substantially in the post-1970 period through the entrance into the game of a whole new series of actors."<sup>48</sup>

As we will see next, the Lombard League may be just what is needed to effect a devolution of power from Rome to the regions.

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<sup>47</sup> Tarrow, 179-80.

<sup>48</sup> R. Leonardi, R. Nanetti, and R. Putnam, "Italy-- Territorial Politics in the Post-War Years: The Case of Regional Reform," West European Politics, 10 (Oct 1987), 105.

CHAPTER FOUR

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The Example of the Lombard League:  
Leading the Forces of Change or Just Another Protest Vote?

Since 1987, Senator Umberto Bossi and his Lega Lombarda, or Lombard League, have attempted to seize the initiative in Italy's endless debate on political reform and achieved a meteoric rise in electoral popularity. Bossi's political platform calls for a revolutionary revamping of Italy's political structure. The ruling elites of the Italian political party system--the Christian Democrats and the Socialists--have, thus far, successfully inhibited significant reform in the quest to maintain their power base. In this chapter I will focus on the following issue: will the Lega continue to grow to the extent where the traditional ruling elite is forced to institute substantial reforms to effect change in the effort to bring about political order and efficiency in the Italian polity? To that end, I will attempt to define the League and its objectives in solving Italy's socio-economic woes; describe how and why the party has achieved its recent successes; illustrate the Italian political system's resistance to the League's efforts; and briefly analyze the League's future prospects.

## Defining the League

The league wants a Federal constitution with a central parliament that coordinates the activities of the parliaments of the three [sub-republics] which have a degree of autonomy which will be modelled on the experience of the Swiss, American and German models...to avoid the current damaging experience of centralism.<sup>1</sup>

--Umberto Bossi

Given the worsening economic situation in Italy and the inability of the regions to take matters in their own hands, the Lombard League and its platform may be giving many Italians hope for a change for the better. The League claims that the central government, controlled by the political party system, or partocracy, is the primary source of many of Italy's socio-political and economic deficiencies. The main complaints against the system include "fiscal mismanagement--particularly regarding funds to the Mezzogiorno; the widespread practice of clientelism, and the failure...to ensure adequate public services." <sup>2</sup> The telephone, postal, railroad, and health care services are some of the "most poorly organized, inconsistent, and

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<sup>1</sup> "Lombard League Sets Out to Slay Giants," Financial Times, 30 March 1992.

<sup>2</sup> James Cross, "The Lega Lombarda: A Spring Protest or the Seeds of Federalism," Italian Politics and Society (Winter 1991), 24-5.

unreliable services in Europe." <sup>3</sup> Some say that the current corruption scandals in Milan, Venice, and Rome involving local, regional, and national politicians from all the major parties are indicative of the changing political environment in Italy--the mainstream political parties "no longer act as voices for currents of opinion or ideology, but have limited their role to supervising the share-out of the national cake." <sup>4</sup>

The League's solution is to neutralize the omnipotence of the partocracy by radically changing the structure of the Republic and create an Italian federation of independent states. League supporters agree to the financing of the central government's foreign and defense policies but demand full regional autonomy with greater spending discretion over tax income. They overtly favor strict immigration laws while less openly support racism against the Mezzogiorno and Africans whom they blame for handicapping Northern economic progress.<sup>5</sup> Bossi asserted in a 1990 interview in Epoca that immigrants of different cultural and racial backgrounds are not readily assimilable into Italian society and, therefore, they weaken the natural links which bring a society together:

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Mark Gilbert, "What the Lega Wants," Italian Politics and Society (Summer 1992), 45.

<sup>5</sup> "Growing Regional Divisions Threaten Italy's Two Main Parties," Financial Times, 27 February 1992, 2.



The cultural differences are too much. The difference in skin color is detrimental to social peace. Imagine if your street, your public square, was full of people of color, you will no longer feel part of your own world.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, Bossi capitalizes on the growing perception in Italy that Third World immigration is a threat to Italian society and links this threat to the political party system's inability to maintain political stability and Italian identity.

The League's favorite political slogans are "An end to Roman robbers" and "Closer to Europe than to Rome," as the party faithful readily identify themselves more with their neighbors to the North and consider Rome and the Mezzogiorno the other two "Italies."<sup>7</sup> In fact, Bossi has claimed that southern Italians represent a cultural "otherness" that is distinctly different from that of northerners. He feels that they do not collectively possess the same notion of modernity.<sup>8</sup> Bossi's proposal to divide Italy into three sub-republics--North, Central, South--and tie them together in an Italian federal system would enable northerners to pursue progress unfettered.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Epoca, 20 May 1990, 12-16.

<sup>7</sup> "Angry Voice of the North," Financial Times, 8 April 1992, 14.

<sup>8</sup> Epoca, 14-15.

<sup>9</sup> "Breve guida alle riforme istituzionali: una repubblica in sei proposte," Panorama (14 Apr 91), 40-1.

The Lega also capitalizes on the northern perception that the inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government are primarily due to the disproportionate number of southerners in the ruling parties and the bureaucracy. Woods reveals, in fact, that 60 percent of Italy's state workers are from the Mezzogiorno--the state bureaucracy and the armed forces are two careers that have minimal entrance requirements and provide the long-term financial security for which many southerners are searching. The perceived imbalance in political parties, however, fails to hold up as 41.5 percent of Italian political parties' leadership is from the North while 36.7 percent is from the South.<sup>10</sup>

Another major aspect of the League's platform is the fight against organized crime. Bossi claims that the Sicilian Mafia, the Neapolitan 'Ndrangheta and the Calabrian Camorra are flourishing because of the protection afforded by the dominating parties of the governing coalition in exchange for votes in the South during election time.<sup>11</sup> League supporters were quick to point out that the DC and PSI, the two largest parties in the south, actually increased their share of the vote in the 1992 national elections in the southern regions. In Venetian elections in

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<sup>10</sup> Dwayne Woods, "The Centre No Longer Holds: The Rise of Regional Leagues in Italian Politics," West European Politics, 15(April 1992), 59.

<sup>11</sup> "Angry Voice of the North," Financial Times, 8 April 1992, 14.

early 1992 Lega Veneta--another regional subsidiary of the Lega Nord organization--used the campaign slogan, "Money from the North, Mafia from the South," to stir emotions and garner votes. Moreover, it would appear that this anti-southern ideology has been strengthened as northern Italians witness a stepped-up campaign of violence by organized crime syndicates in Sicily and other regions of the Mezzogiorno. The much publicized murders of Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, Italy's leading anti-Mafia magistrates, only served to heighten this racist perception and no doubt fortify the League's claim of the southern threat to political order.<sup>12</sup>

In an interview with the Italian periodical Panorama, Bossi was asked what his first actions would be if he was named Prime Minister. He said he would: decentralize and streamline Italy's pension system to enable the individual regione to control its administration; close the central public services administration and privatize the national health care system and other public services; and lower interest rates on government-owned BOTs (treasury bills and bonds) to come in line with the rest of the European Community.<sup>13</sup>

The League is a grass-roots movement relying on a broad range of support from common workers, merchants, small

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<sup>12</sup> Woods, 61.

<sup>13</sup> "Macche' piccone," Panorama (8 Dec 91), 47.

businessmen, and professionals. Although advocating revolutionary change, the movement is not a radical or reactionary one bent on destroying Italy. Interestingly, the League is primarily a middle class movement--something which has never before been a powerful force in Italian politics.<sup>14</sup> The PRI has always been a minor party, although it has participated in government on many occasions. Dwayne Woods explains that the League phenomenon is a result of the alienation of the middle class from status quo politics beginning in the 1970s. He goes on to say that the League has "stepped in to fill the political and ideological vacuum of the party system in Italy, which has been unable to reconcile through traditional methods the [socio-politico-economic] differences between regions..."<sup>15</sup>

Bossi has encouraged the spread of other autonomist-minded groups in neighboring regions. In February 1990, Bossi joined his league from the Lombard region with the others in the North to form Lega Nord, or the Northern League. Lega Centrale and Lega Sud have also since been formed. Although commonly referred to as the Lombard League, the movement is actually much larger and more accurately referred to as Lega Nord.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, Bossi

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<sup>14</sup> "Non solo Lega," Nuovo Mezzogiorno, 33 (September 1990), 3-4.

<sup>15</sup> Woods, 71-2.

<sup>16</sup> "Lombard League Sets Out to Slay Giants, Financial Times, 30 March 1992.

and his Lega Lombarda hold a more influential position in Lega Nord as its oldest and most popular member. Next, the factors behind the League's explosion in popularity will be examined. Is it a force to be reckoned with or just another "flash" party?

### **Success of the League**

Will the recent success of the Lombard League continue? There have been several populist-minded and regional parties in post-war Italian politics, from the Common Man's Party (UQ) and Social Proletarians (PSIUP) to the South Tyrol People's Party (SVP) and Sardinian Action Party (PSA). One commonality among these groups is their limited scope of representation. Another is their short life spans. The first pair could be considered typical "flash" parties as they lasted at the most only two national elections; the second pair, longer, however they have only achieved token representation in the national Chamber of Deputies. The League's future, based on performance thus far, is promising. After founding the "Autonomist Lombard League" in 1984, Umberto Bossi was elected senator for his hometown of Varese in the 1987 general elections. The League's performance during these elections was a modest one--1.4 percent of the vote nationally and three percent of the vote

in their home region of Lombardy.<sup>17</sup> The party gained momentum when it won two seats in the June 1989 European Parliament elections. The Lega made the partocracy take notice after its remarkable victories in the May 1990 administrative elections. In regional, provincial, and city council races across Italy, the Lombard League garnered five percent of the vote, making it the fourth strongest party nation-wide. In Lombardy alone it won twenty percent of the vote. All major parties, with the exception of the PSI, lost votes. The biggest losers were the PDS and the DC, who maintained its hegemony through gains in the South.<sup>18</sup> The November 1991 municipal elections in the northern city of Brescia have demonstrated that the Lega is a national contender. Considered to be "a test of national opinion" by the major parties, the results of this local election enhanced the League's credibility even further. With all the main parties losing votes, the League deposed the DC as the "largest single party in town" by collecting 24 percent of the vote.<sup>19</sup>

The League's performance in the 1992 national Parliamentary elections was equally impressive, as it secured 8.7 percent of the vote and 55 seats (up from one in

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<sup>17</sup> Cross, 21.

<sup>18</sup> Salvatore Scarpino, "The League Phenomenon," Notizie dall'Italia, 35 (June 1990), 1-2.

<sup>19</sup> "Italy's Axeman," The Economist (30 Nov 1991), 50.

the 1987 elections) in the Chamber of Deputies. Lega Nord is now the fourth largest party in Italy and second largest in the North. The '92 elections have demonstrated that it is more than just another "flash-in-the-pan" party fulfilling the role of the protest vote; the League is a people's movement with an electoral mandate for genuine reform. Interestingly, the Lega's performance drew off votes from all the major parties, indicating that its basis of popular support cut across class and ideological lines. Cesare Crosta, Lega chief in the Lazio regione thinks the people who chose to protest either invalidated their ballot or abstained from voting altogether. He believes their platform was the real reason why Italians voted for the Lega.<sup>20</sup>

What explains the rapid growth of the Lega in the North? Scarpino postulates three factors for the party's success: the fall of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the rise of separatist nationalism across the European continent; and utter disgust with the partocracy. Without the "threat" of the spread of communism in Italy, the traditional parties could no longer "coerce" Italians to vote for them. Voters also were influenced by what they saw as expressions of liberty and nationalistic pride throughout the East. Finally, there are growing numbers of disaffected voters who are thoroughly

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<sup>20</sup> Cross, 21.

disenchanted as a result of the abuses by the traditional political party system.<sup>21</sup> In fact, a recent survey of 13,000 Western and Eastern Europeans indicated that 73 percent of Italians were uninterested in politics and 74 percent felt that their politicians were "inefficient and wasteful."<sup>22</sup>

Dwayne Woods argues that the rapid emergence of the League can be explained as a contemporary manifestation of socio-economic changes occurring in Italy over the past 30 years. Specifically, that local and regional units of government have grown to become "centers of political legitimacy and representation" where previously the center (Rome) held sway via the national parties. Woods describes a model of Italian politics which perhaps best explains the stark contrast of the Lega Lombarda to the political center and the League's rising popularity. He postulates that the "rise of regional leagues as a major political force in Italian politics is a reflection of the erosion of center-periphery relations established by parties after the Second World War."<sup>23</sup> This "system of governance" set up by the major parties was based upon clientelism, patronage, and ideological appeal in the effort to integrate an

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<sup>21</sup> Scarpino, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Umberto Venturini, "Italian Elections--Spring 1992: An Overview," Italian Journal, no.1, vol. 6, 1992, 5.

<sup>23</sup> Woods, 57.



"economically and politically segmented society." What eventually occurred, however, was that the political process became very "structured" with the parties extending their influence throughout every institution. Moreover, claims Woods, economic modernization in northern and central Italy has created a more complex and fragmented society which has weakened the initially strong post-war, center-periphery linkages. As regional governments were finally empowered, as provided in the Constitution, "economic and political differentiation converged." With the creation of a new urban middle class, which was increasingly turning away from the traditional leftist and Catholic sub-cultures, a new force arose which looked to an alternative for representation and legitimacy. These new groups are now calling for reform of the constitutional and historical tradition of Jacobin, centralized politics in Italy. Woods references Pasquino in his description of an Italian society where the "traditional class and religious cleavages ...are no longer determinant in individual and collective mobilization."<sup>24</sup> As previously noted, the League has been able to secure votes from both traditionally Communist- and DC-voting Italians. At least for some voters, then, regional identity and autonomy, instead of the traditional class and religious notions, are the ideals with which

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<sup>24</sup> Woods, 70-1.

political legitimacy is identified.<sup>25</sup>

Does the Lega have the strength and stamina to fully engage the partocracy in a protracted battle? Unlike most other Italian political parties, the League is disciplined and organizationally strong; it has displayed a decisiveness of purpose throughout its campaign. Bossi is said to demand absolute loyalty and obedience. One of his workers commented, "it is like the KGB, one commands and the others execute."<sup>26</sup> These traits will become increasingly important as the League continues to grow in popularity and directly challenges the more powerful parties in future elections.

Another indicator of success for the League is the founding of their Autonomous Lombard Union (SAL). Bossi claims that the SAL has a "penetrative capacity three times greater than that of the political movement" and believes that "within two years it will be the major trade union in Lombardy" displacing the Christian Democratic CISL, Communist (PDS) CGIL, and the Social Democratic-Republican UIL.<sup>27</sup> In addition to their own labor union, the League has formed an employer's organization--Alia--and, more recently, a national lobbying group for small and medium businesses--Cicos. Bossi is expected to receive a lot of

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 66-71.

<sup>26</sup> Cross, 23.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 22.

support through these organizations from those small and medium firms which make up a large part of his constituency.<sup>28</sup>

With political change continuing to occur across Europe and the partocracy maintaining its modus operandi, the same motivations to vote for the League may well persist for some years to come. This bodes well for the future success of Bossi and his followers.

### **Resisting the League**

Bureaucratic inertia, DC hegemony, and Jacobin fears all have contributed to stymying the League and other reformers. The bureaucratic nature of the partocracy counters the move to decentralize. Inertia can be seen within the political process as political party foot-dragging runs rampant. The political battles the League have and will continue to face are aptly described:

Regional reorganization was carried out in the tradition of the Italian parties' political conduct of using institutional tools and therefore measures of reorganization, not to meet society's needs and aspirations, but to maintain at all events an operational consensus for protecting the power base and preserving the role of the party system.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> EIU Country Report: Italy, 4 (December 1991), 12.

<sup>29</sup> Regionalism in European Politics, Roger Morgan, ed., (London: PSI, 1986), 18.

Efforts to derail the Lega can be seen at the very highest levels of the partocracy. DC party secretary, Arnaldo Forlani, is trying to scare voters away from supporting the Lombard League by using the case of the violent break up of the Yugoslav Federation as an example or vision of what could happen to Italy if Bossi achieves his goal of a tri-state Italian federation. Bossi responds that Yugoslavia is in a much different situation than that which faces Italy. A more appropriate comparison should be made with the federation to the north--Switzerland --which can point to 700 years of stability.<sup>30</sup>

The DC has recently tried to blunt the League's appeal to Northern Italians by adopting a more northern identity of their own. DC minister for institutional reform, Mino Martinazzoli, has proposed to lessen the national leadership's control over party election lists, increase substantially the percentage of public finances going to local party branches, and increase representation of the northern regioni in the party. The cumulative effect would be to decentralize DC party management--which presently favors southern and central regioni--and make the Christian Democrats more appealing to northerners.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Massimo Franco, "Bossi non ci Lega," Panorama, 1318 (21 July 1991), 53.

<sup>31</sup> EIU Country Report: Italy, 4 (December 1991), 12.

On a more covert plane, the DC has been suspected of forging a scheme during the '92 elections which would inundate voters with a bewildering number of political party choices. Specifically, say League supporters, 37 of the 109 political parties vying for votes contained the word "league"--an attempt to confuse potential Northern League voters.<sup>32</sup>

Michael Keating explains well the Jacobin fears of the partocracy that are weakening the League's efforts to achieve decentralization and regional autonomy:

There has been a marked fear of regional government among nationally-based administrators and politicians, concerned that regional government would indeed be independent of the center and undermine both national policies and their own power bases...<sup>33</sup>

Norman Kogan believes these fears manifest themselves in a "sense of insecurity" of the ruling elite and which will ultimately "guarantee continuing tight controls by the central government over the localities."<sup>34</sup> Even the Vatican conveys these fears. The Osservatore Romano issued a warning against the League, characterizing it as a

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<sup>32</sup> "Italian Voters Face a Profusion of Parties," Financial Times, 3 April 1992, 2.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Keating, "Does Regional Government Work? The Experience of Italy, France and Spain," Governance, 1 (April 1988), 186.

<sup>34</sup> Norman Kogan, The Government of Italy, NY: Crowell, 1962, 164.

"dangerous separation from the parties and civilized society." Vatican Radio likewise portrayed the movement as a "worrisome phenomenon" and "an element of instability and ungovernability."<sup>35</sup> Given the Vatican's close relationship with the ruling Christian Democrats, however, these invectives are not surprising. Although Bossi is not anti-clerical, he cannot be considered "confessional"; the Lombard League would be better classified as a laical party like the PSI and PDS.

### **Future Prospects**

The following opinion by Keating describes a formula for success in attaining greater regional political power that seems to bode well for the League as it strives to remodel the Italian polity and realize regional autonomy:

...the only chance for regions to come into their own lies in breaking the DC monopoly on the state, with the clientelistic network which this sustains...[this] would itself represent a revolution in Italian politics comparable in magnitude to the regime change in France in 1958. Separate regional party systems may help, if the regional parties are able to exert some leverage in national politics...this will require the development of regional political leadership.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Cross, 25.

<sup>36</sup> Keating, 202.

But as Robert Leonardi points out:

In recent years there have been numerous attempts by the parties of the left to decentralize the State... in an attempt to break the DC's national system of clientelism in support of the party organization and individual party leaders. However, these attempts have been met at every turn by political as well as procedural complications. Therefore, any change in the present situation would require not only a change in government coalitions and policies but also a complete purge and restructuring of the State apparatus.<sup>37</sup>

Given the strength and omnipresence of the partocracy, such radical change is unlikely in the short run. We may have seen the beginning of such change, however, as a result of the 1992 elections.

Although the record of decentralization and other institutional reforms throughout Italian history is not very encouraging for League supporters, there have been other developments recently that are. In addition to the Parliamentary elections, the decisive result of the national referendum held in June 1991-- 95.6 percent voting in favor of electoral reform--has increased the pressure on politicians to enact legislation effecting reform.<sup>38</sup> The politicians will have to acknowledge the increasing alienation of the electorate, as evidenced by the referendum results and the growing popularity of Lega Nord.

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<sup>37</sup> Leonardi, 265.

<sup>38</sup> EIU Country Report: Italy, 2 (June 1991), 10.

Additionally, with the single integrated market in 1992 and full economic and monetary union in 1997, EMU integration difficulties notwithstanding, the possibility exists that Italy will be left behind due to the central government's ineptness in handling the economy. This could result in debilitating economic effects on its economy and the type of grave crisis the Lombard League needs to topple the partocracy. Short of a severe crisis, however, Bossi will need to make improvements in several areas if he hopes to maintain his political momentum and carry the fight to the heart of the partocracy: he must somehow make his message more appealing to central and southern Italians where the League failed to make significant inroads; the League must grow if it is to become a true national contender; and finances, now stretched, must be improved.<sup>39</sup> The 1990's will indeed impact significantly on Italian social, political, and economic life; the fortunes of Umberto Bossi and the Lega Lombarda will depend greatly on the dynamics of this decade. Given the League's performance over the past three years, continued success seems very likely. Whether or not the local and regional elections in the near future will give Bossi the additional electoral strength will be crucial to his future prospects of forcing the present party system to change.

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<sup>39</sup> "Angry Voice of the North," Financial Times, 8 April 1992, 14.



## CHAPTER FIVE

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## CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to explain the current debate on institutional reform in Italy. In attempting to answer the question I posed in the introduction, "Can and, if so, will genuine change be effected?", I have concluded that:

a) The current political system in Italy and its institutions lack legitimacy because there is a perceived lack of representation of the electorate.

b) The public is as cynical today as they have been since Italy became a nation.

c) Voters are taking matters in their own hands via the abrogative referendum and grass roots political organizations such as the Lombard League and La Rete.

d) Although political leaders and ordinary citizens argue that the system is broken and reform is needed, no particular group wants to sacrifice its benefits for the collective good of the nation.

e) The government is unable to impose its will on its institutions as efforts at reform quickly bog down in party factionalism and bureaucratic inertia.

Given these observations, I believe the political elite will play with the reform notion, perhaps even assent to some minor but obvious measures in areas such as regional reform--by granting to all regions the special statutes currently applicable to the five special regions--and

economic reform--by privatizing and cutting overall public sector spending--but will continue to debate and to derive the benefits of the exaggerated role parties play in Italian politics. The parties in power will continue to engage in what LaPalombara refers to as spettacolo, for the benefit of the public, while simultaneously pulling the power levers of government to fortify their own hegemonic position.

Gattopardismo is alive and well in Italy--that is, the more things change, the more they stay the same. A good example of this is the new bicameral commission on institutional reform currently being formed with 60 MPs (30 senators and 30 deputies). This strikes a remarkable similarity to the Bozzi Commission of the early 1980s where each house provided twenty members to come together and discuss reform proposals, ostensibly to forge a consensus on those deemed most urgent. Typically, the Bozzi Committee disbanded after almost two years of debate and spettacolo and no concrete results. I believe that this new Commission of Sixty will meet with a very similar fate; although today's conditions may be different from those in the early 1980s, they are not radically so--more importantly, neither are the parties nor their organizational goals and behavior.

I also feel the following are likely to occur in the short term:

a) The Italian citizenry will continue to find ways around the perceived lack of representation by the central

government, as it has with referenda and regional, grass-roots movements.

b) The Lombard League will continue to be a force in the north, especially at the municipal, provincial, and regional levels of government, but will not have success in imposing its vague agenda on the nation as a whole.

c) The Milan corruption scandal, like so many political scandals in Italy before, will play itself out and force out many of those figures already implicated; but the scandal will not permanently damage the careers of the political elite nor significantly alter the personalities of the parties.

d) The PDS, already embroiled in an internal party conflict, will continue to weaken and may even experience another split as the riformisti of Chamber president Giorgio Napolitano move to the Right away from the more Left-leaning wing of the party led by party secretary Occhetto. This intra-party divisiveness makes the prospect of a unified Left opposition--a coalition of the PDS, PSI, PSDI, and Communist Refoundation--even more remote.

e) Political machinations notwithstanding, the Italian economy will revive, assisted by a world- and European-wide recovery. I do feel, however, that the parties will find the political fortitude to enact tough economic sacrifices to reduce the public debt and budget deficit in order to help the economy improve.

Above all else, what will persist are those very characteristics of the Italian political system which are often blamed for the country's ills--the highly centralized oligarchy, the lack of alternation of power, the existence of weak governments, and the omnipresent nature of its political parties--all longstanding and deeply entrenched elements of the Italian political culture which make Italian style democracy unique and contribute to a system which, although far from perfect, continues to function--"Eppur si muove!" ("And yet it moves!").

TABLE 1

1992 Parliamentary Election Results  
(National Distribution of the Votes)

	Chamber of Deputies				Senate		1987		1987	
	1992	1987	1992	1987	1992	1987	1992	1987	1992	1987
	% vote	Seats	% vote	Seats	% vote	Seats	% vote	Seats	% vote	Seats
Government total	48.8	331	53.7	356	46.3	163	49.1	169		
Christian Democrats (DC)	29.7	206	34.3	234	27.3	107	33.6	125		
Socialists (PSI)	13.6	92	14.3	94	13.6	49	10.9	36		
Liberals (PLI)	2.8	17	2.1	11	2.8	4	2.2	3		
Social Democrats (PSDI)	2.7	16	3.0	17	2.6	3	2.4	5		
Opposition total	51.2	299	46.3	274	53.7	152	50.9	146		
Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)	16.1	107	26.6	177	17.0	64	28.3	101		
Northern League	8.7	55	0.5	1	8.2	25	1.3	1		
Communist Refoundation	5.6	35	-	-	6.5	20	-	-		
Italian Social Movement (MSI)	5.4	34	5.9	35	6.5	16	6.5	16		
Republicans (PRI)	4.4	27	3.7	21	4.7	10	3.8	8		
Greens	2.8	16	2.5	13	3.1	4	2.0	1		
La Rete	1.9	12	-	-	0.7	3	-	-		
Others	6.3	13	7.1	27	7.0	10	8.9	19		

TABLE 2

1992 Parliamentary Election Results  
(Regional Distribution of the Vote)

	DC	PSI	PSDI	PLI	Government	PRI	PDS	Lega Lombarda
<b>North</b>								
1992	24.0	11.9	1.6	2.7	40.2	4.8	15.8	15.6
1987	32.0	14.7	2.5	2.4	51.6	4.1	26.1 <sup>a</sup>	1.0
<b>Centre</b>								
1992	27.7	12.8	2.4	2.5	45.4	5.1	26.9	2.3
1987	31.0	12.9	2.2	1.4	47.5	3.3	34.3 <sup>a</sup>	-
<b>South</b>								
1992	39.3	17.8	4.2	3.2	64.4	3.1	13.6	0.3
1987	40.7	14.8	4.2	1.9	61.6	3.1	23.1 <sup>a</sup>	-
<b>Islands<sup>b</sup></b>								
1992	39.3	14.4	5.5	3.4	62.5	3.8	12.4	0.2
1987	37.6	14.0	3.8	2.5	57.9	4.1	21.3 <sup>a</sup>	-

<sup>a</sup> Italian Communist Party. <sup>b</sup> Sicily and Sardinia.

TABLE 3  
Volatility in Elections  
to the  
Chamber of Deputies, 1948-1992

<u>Election</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Seats</u>
1948	.230	.215
1953	.141	.131
1958	.052	.044
1963	.085	.079
1968	.078	.068
1972	.053	.054
1976	.091	.094
1979	.053	.052
1983	.083	.068
1987	.085	.075
1992	.151	.138

Source: Mershon, p. 54.



TABLE 4

Voter Turn-out in Parliamentary Elections  
(By Region)

Region	1992	1987
Piemonte	89.8	91.2
Valle D'Aosta	90.4	89.0
Lombardia	92.2	92.8
Trentino-Alto Adige	91.9	91.9
Veneto	91.5	92.5
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	88.7	90.6
Liguria	87.3	89.4
<u>Emilia Romagna</u>	<u>93.8</u>	<u>94.9</u>
<b>Northern Italy</b>	<b>91.4</b>	<b>92.4</b>
Toscana	91.0	93.2
Umbria	90.8	92.7
Marche	90.0	91.7
<u>Lazio</u>	<u>88.6</u>	<u>89.6</u>
<b>Central Italy</b>	<b>89.8</b>	<b>91.3</b>
Abruzzi	81.7	83.4
Molise	74.7	76.2
Campania	82.2	84.3
Puglia	84.4	86.9
Basilicata	82.8	85.1
<u>Calabria</u>	<u>74.1</u>	<u>77.2</u>
<b>Southern Italy</b>	<b>81.4</b>	<b>83.6</b>
Sicilia	77.4	79.1
<u>Sardegna</u>	<u>83.3</u>	<u>87.1</u>
<b>Islands</b>	<b>78.8</b>	<b>81.0</b>
<b>NATIONAL MEAN</b>	<b>87.2</b>	<b>88.8</b>

Source: Italian Journal, no. 2 & 3, vol. 6, 1992, 13.

TABLE 5  
Italian Prime Ministers and Governments Since June 1945

Prime minister	Coalition	Duration
Parri	DC-PCI-PSI-PLI-PDL-Pd'A	6/45-12/45
De Gasperi I	DC-PCI-PSI-PLI-PDL-Pd'A	12/45-7/46
De Gasperi II	DC-PCI-PSI-PRI	7/46-2/47
De Gasperi III	DC-PCI-PSI	2/47-5/47
De Gasperi IV	DC-PLI-PSLI-PRI	5/47-5/48
De Gasperi V	DC-PLI-PSLI-PRI	5/48-1/50
De Gasperi VI	DC-PSLI-PRI	1/50-7/51
De Gasperi VI	DC-PRI	7/51-7/53
De Gasperi VIII	DC	7/53-8/53
Pella	DC	8/53-1/54
Fanfani I	DC	1/54-2/54
Scelba	DC-PDSI-PLI	2/54-7/55
Segni I	DC-PSDI-PLI	7/55-5/57
Zoli	DC	5/57-7/58
Fanfani II	DC-PSDI	7/56-2/59
Segni II	DC	2/59-3/60
Tambroni	DC	3/60-7/60
Fanfani III	DC	7/60-2/62
Fanfani IV	DC-PSDI-PRI	2/62-6/63
Leone I	DC	6/63-12/63
Moro I	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	12/63-7/64
Moro II	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	7/64-2/66
Moro III	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	2/66-6/68
Leone II	DC	6/68-12/68
Rumor I	DC-PSI-PRI	12/68-8/69
Rumor II	DC	8/69-3/70
Rumor III	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	3/70-8/70
Colombo	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	8/70-2/72
Andreotti I	DC	2/72-6/72
Andreotti II	DC-PSDI-PLI	6/72-7/73
Rumor IV	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	7/73-3/74
Rumor V	DC-PSI-PSDI	3/74-11/74
Moro IV	DC-PRI	11/74-2/76
Moro V	DC	2/76-7/76
Andreotti III	DC	7/76-3/78
Andreotti IV	DC	3/78-3/79
Andreotti V	DC-PSDI-PRI	3/79-8/79
Cossiga I	DC-PSDI-PLI	8/79-4/80
Cossiga II	DC-PSI-PRI	4/80-10/80
Forlani	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI	10/80-6/81
Spadolini I	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	6/81-8/82
Spadolini II	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	8/82-12/82
Fanfani V	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	12/82-8/83
Craxi I	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	8/83-8/86
Craxi II	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	8/86-4/87
Fanfani VI	DC	4/87-7/87
Goria	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	7/87-4/88
De Mita I	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	4/88-7/89
Andreotti VI	DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI	7/89-

Source: Hine and Finocchi, 80-1.

TABLE 6  
Legislative Output, Chamber of Deputies, 1948-1987

	LEGISLATURES								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Government bills proposed	1168	782	758	805	494	627	797	975	754
Other bills proposed	1028	1920	2964	3333	3063	3205	2129	3344	3618
Government bills passed in Assembly	500	433	421	398	189	324	337	384	326
Other bills passed in Assembly	87	63	63	47	16	42	84	42	48
Government bills passed in Commission	1496	1006	919	861	663	617	307	477	424
Other bills passed in Commission	344	592	639	743	480	493	145	369	337
Decree Laws presented	29	60	30	94	69	124	167	477	424

*Source: Le legislature repubblicane nelle statistiche parlamentari, and Resoconti Sommari delle Legislature VII, VIII, e IX (Rome: Servizio documentazione e statistiche parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, various years)*

*Note:* this refers only to the Chamber of Deputies. It therefore ignores the considerable (though smaller) volume of legislation first presented in the Senate. Hence also total bills passed in any legislature includes some bills first presented in the Senate.

Legislatures: 1 - 1948-53  
 2 - 1953-58  
 3 - 1958-63  
 4 - 1963-68  
 5 - 1968-72  
 6 - 1972-76  
 7 - 1976-79  
 8 - 1979-83  
 9 - 1983-87

Source: Furlong, 64.

TABLE 7

Distribution of Per Capita Income Among Italy's 20 Regions  
(EEC Average=100)

Region	1971	1974	1979	1981
Liguria	97.0	88.2	78.4	84.4
Lombardia	98.8	91.8	82.8	89.7
Piemonte	91.8	85.6	79.1	83.7
<u>Valle d'Aosta</u>	<u>99.4</u>	<u>105.3</u>	<u>90.4</u>	<u>98.6</u>
<b>Northwest Italy</b>	<b>96.8</b>	<b>92.7</b>	<b>82.7</b>	<b>89.2</b>
Emilia-Romagna	84.6	81.3	78.1	86.3
Friuli-Ven-Giulia	77.7	75.2	69.1	78.0
Lazio	80.7	70.7	64.3	70.7
Marche	67.4	63.0	62.1	69.5
Toscana	80.5	73.5	70.4	76.5
Trentino-Alto-Adige	70.6	68.7	69.0	75.3
Umbria	66.3	63.6	61.1	68.0
<u>Veneto</u>	<u>74.9</u>	<u>69.4</u>	<u>65.4</u>	<u>71.5</u>
<b>Center/NE Italy</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>75.5</b>
Abruzzo	55.4	52.1	51.0	56.6
Basilicata	47.5	44.9	45.5	48.1
Calabria	43.5	40.5	37.3	42.5
Campania	53.2	47.4	43.2	47.3
Molise	44.5	42.3	44.2	49.5
Puglia	52.8	49.4	44.5	48.3
Sardegna	59.8	52.5	48.5	49.3
<u>Sicilia</u>	<u>53.3</u>	<u>48.1</u>	<u>43.5</u>	<u>47.8</u>
<b>Mezzogiorno</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>48.7</b>
 <b>NATIONAL AVERAGE</b>	 <b>74.2</b>	 <b>68.5</b>	 <b>63.2</b>	 <b>68.8</b>

Source: Adrian Carello, The Northern Question, Newark, NJ:  
U of Delaware Press, 1989.

TABLE 8

Italian Citizens Emigrating from their Regions in Jan 1984

Region	Population (1)	Emigrants (2)	$\frac{(1)}{(2)}\%$
Liguria	1,867,363	112,914	6.0
Lombardia	8,837,656	136,346	1.5
Piemonte	4,451,271	141,087	3.2
<u>Valle d'Aosta</u>	<u>113,720</u>	<u>17,290</u>	<u>15.2</u>
<b>Northwest Italy</b>	<b>3,817,503</b>	<b>101,909</b>	<b>2.7</b>
Emilia-Romagna	3,935,834	176,811	4.5
Friuli-Ven-Giulia	1,244,406	242,484	19.5
Lazio	4,921,859	169,445	3.4
Marche	1,390,388	119,029	8.6
Toscana	3,566,763	80,528	2.3
Trentino-Alto-Adige	866,377	80,343	9.3
Umbria	795,218	74,090	9.3
<u>Veneto</u>	<u>4,277,501</u>	<u>256,726</u>	<u>6.0</u>
<b>Center/NE Italy</b>	<b>2,624,793</b>	<b>149,932</b>	<b>5.7</b>
Abruzzo	1,211,323	177,201	14.6
Basilicata	614,596	146,720	23.9
Calabria	2,034,425	525,280	25.8
Campania	5,280,268	337,712	6.4
Molise	329,705	113,691	34.5
Puglia	3,771,329	314,224	8.3
Sardegna	1,552,767	183,200	11.8
<u>Sicilia</u>	<u>4,861,230</u>	<u>671,565</u>	<u>13.8</u>
<b>Mezzogiorno</b>	<b>2,456,955</b>	<b>308,699</b>	<b>12.6</b>
<b>NATIONAL AVERAGE</b>	<b>55,923,999</b>	<b>4,076,686</b>	<b>7.3</b>

Source: Adrian Carello, The Northern Question.

TABLE 9  
Net Migration by Region, 1951-1977

	Net annual migration rate (%)		
	1951-1961	1961-1971	1971-1977
Piedmont-Val d'Aosta	10.9	9.3	3.2
Lombardy	7.7	7.3	2.7
Liguria	10.9	4.6	2.8
Sub-total North-West	9.1	7.6	2.9
Trentino-Alto Adige	-2.2	-1.0	1.0
Veneto	-9.9	0.7	2.7
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	-4.5	4.9	5.1
Emilia-Romagna	-1.0	2.1	3.8
Sub-total North-East	-5.2	1.6	3.6
Tuscany	1.2	2.9	4.3
Umbria	-8.7	-5.3	3.4
Marche	-9.8	-2.9	2.0
Latium	6.6	6.8	3.2
Sub-total Centre	1.0	3.2	3.4
Abruzzi-Molise	-19.5	-9.5	3.5
Campania	-7.5	-8.8	-1.7
Apulia	-11.9	-9.4	0.3
Basilicata	-18.4	-20.4	-4.9
Calabria	-20.0	-18.2	-4.1
Sub-total South	-12.9	-11.1	-1.0
Sicily	-9.2	-13.0	0.2
Sardinia	-8.6	-8.9	1.1
Sub-total Islands	-9.1	-12.1	0.1
Total Italy	-2.7	-1.0	1.8

Source: King, 172.

TABLE 10  
Synthetic Index of the Intensity of Regional Problems in the  
EEC (1981-85)

RANK	REGION	VALUE	RANK	REGION	VALUE	RANK	REGION	VALUE
1	Basilicata (I)	36.9	54	Lombard (NL)	91.4	108	Bourgogne (F)	121.9
2	Calabria (I)	38.0	55	Liege prov. (B)	91.6	109	Muenster (D)	122.0
3	Andalusia (ESP)	38.8	56	Weser-Ems (D)	92.2	110	Champagne-Ardenne (F)	122.0
4	Extremadura (ESP)	39.2	57	Friesland (NL)	92.3	111	Utrecht (NL)	122.4
5	Canarias (ESP)	46.1	58	Greater Manchester (UK)	93.0	112	Arnsberg (D)	122.4
6	Ireland (I)	47.6	59	Bor. Cen. Fls. Lot. Tay. (UK)	93.0	113	Dorset, Somerset (UK)	122.4
7	Sardegna (I)	49.4	60	Lincolnshire (UK)	95.0	114	Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I)	122.9
8	Castilla Mancha (ESP)	50.0	61	Basse-Normandie (F)	95.3	115	Beds., Herts (UK)	123.0
9	Thracis (GR)	50.5	62	Lancashire (UK)	95.8	116	Franch-Comte (F)	123.0
10	Holise (I)	50.6	63	Overijssel (NL)	96.0	117	Braunschweig (D)	123.4
11	Murcia (ESP)	51.3	64	Gwent, MSW, Glamorg. (UK)	96.3	118	Rassel (D)	123.7
12	Galicia (ESP)	53.8	65	Gelderland (NL)	96.4	119	Koblenz (D)	123.8
13	Ipirou (GR)	54.4	66	Kent (UK)	96.5	120	Drenthe (NL)	123.8
14	Comm. Valenciana (ESP)	54.6	67	Nord-Pas-de-Calais (F)	96.6	121	Toscana (I)	124.0
15	Sicilia (I)	54.9	68	Noord-Brabant (NL)	96.7	122	Cheshire (UK)	124.0
16	Castilla Leon (ESP)	55.0	69	Cornwall, Devon (UK)	96.8	---	---	---
17	Campania (I)	55.7	70	Oberpfalz (D)	96.9	123	Detmold (D)	124.7
18	Pelop. & Ditt. Ster. Ell. (GR)	56.9	71	Bretagne (F)	98.0	124	Centre (F)	125.0
19	Puglia (I)	57.2	72	Luxembourg (B)	98.5	125	Unterfranken (D)	125.0
20	Thessalias (GR)	57.2	73	Leics., Northants (UK)	98.9	126	Oberfranken (D)	125.0
21	Cataluna (ESP)	57.7	---	---	---	127	E. Suss., Surrey, W. Suss. (UK)	125.0
22	Pays Vasco (ESP)	58.3	74	Pays de la Loire (F)	100.6	128	Zeeland (NL)	125.0
23	Asturias (ESP)	58.4	75	Derbys., Notts. (UK)	100.7	129	Cumbria (UK)	125.0
24	Portugal (POR)	58.4	76	Highlands, Islands (UK)	101.2	130	Antwerpen prov. (B)	125.0
25	Kritis (GR)	58.4	77	Oost-Vlaanderen (B)	101.3	131	Noord-Holland (NL)	125.0
26	Anatolikos Makedonias (GR)	59.0	78	Vest for Storebaelt (DK)	101.4	132	Piemonte (I)	125.0
27	Aragon (ESP)	59.5	79	Umbria (I)	101.7	133	Schleswig-Holstein (D)	125.4
28	Cantabria (ESP)	59.7	80	Groningen (NL)	102.0	134	Hannover (D)	125.8
29	Madrid (ESP)	59.8	81	East Anglia (UK)	102.2	135	Giessen (D)	125.9
30	Navarra (ESP)	59.9	82	Trentino-Alto Adige (I)	102.4	136	Zuid-Holland (NL)	125.9
31	Anat. Stereas ke Nisun (GR)	61.9	83	Ost for Storebaelt (DK)	102.9	137	Emilia-Romagna (I)	125.9
32	Kent, ke Ditt. Makedonias (GR)	63.0	84	Saarland (D)	103.6	138	Rhein (D)	125.9
33	Northern Ireland (UK)	64.4	85	Picardie (F)	103.7	139	Rhone-Alpes (F)	125.9
34	Rioja (ESP)	65.9	86	Marche (I)	104.1	140	Schwaben (D)	125.9
35	Baleares (ESP)	66.8	87	Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwyn, Powys (UK)	104.2	141	Liguria (I)	125.9
36	Nisun Anatolikou Egeou (GR)	67.1	88	Niederbayern (D)	104.3	142	Grampian (UK)	125.9
---	---	---	89	Haute-Normandie (F)	104.5	143	Lombardia (I)	125.9
37	West Midlands County (UK)	67.8	90	Trier (D)	105.3	---	---	---
38	Merseyside (UK)	74.8	91	West-Vlaanderen (B)	106.1	144	Tuebingen (D)	124.8
39	Abruzzi (I)	75.7	92	Lazio (I)	106.3	145	Freiburg (D)	124.9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
40	Dum. & Gal., Strathclyde (UK)	76.2	93	Hants., Isle of Wight (UK)	106.4	146	Greater London (UK)	125.0
41	Limburg (B)	78.1	94	Bremen (D)	106.8	147	Dusseldorf (D)	126.0
42	Hainaut (B)	81.2	95	Essex (UK)	108.3	148	Alsace (F)	126.4
43	Salop, Staffordshire (UK)	82.1	96	Brabant (B)	108.4	149	Mittelfranken (D)	126.4
44	Humberside (UK)	82.4	97	Auvergne (F)	108.5	150	Novedstadsregionen (DK)	126.4
45	South Yorkshire (UK)	83.2	98	Aquitaine (F)	109.0	151	Berlin (West) (D)	126.7
---	---	---	99	Limousin (F)	109.2	152	Valle d'Aosta (I)	126.7
46	West Yorkshire (UK)	84.0	100	North Yorkshire (UK)	109.2	153	Rheinessen-Pfalz (D)	126.7
47	Corse (F)	84.2	101	Veneto (I)	109.5	154	Luxembourg (GD) (L)	124.0
48	Heref. & Wores., Warwicks (UK)	85.7	102	Avon, Glos., Wilts. (UK)	109.8	155	Karlsruhe (D)	126.7
49	Languedoc-Roussillon (F)	87.2	103	Midi-Pyrenees (F)	109.8	156	Ile de France (F)	126.7
50	Cleveland, Durham (UK)	88.1	104	Berks., Bucks., Oxon. (UK)	109.8	157	Hamburg (D)	126.7
51	Namur prov. (B)	89.2	105	Provence-Alpes-C.d'Azur (F)	110.4	158	Stuttgart (D)	126.7
52	Northumb., Tyne & Wear (UK)	89.8	106	Lorraine (F)	110.5	159	Oberbayern (D)	126.7
53	Poitou-Charentes (F)	90.7	107	Lueneburg (D)	110.5	160	Darmstadt (D)	126.7

Source: 3d Periodic Report of the Regions of the EC, Luxembourg, 1987.

TABLE 11  
CSC Synthetic Index of Development (1990)

n.	provincia	indice	n.	provincia	indice	n.	provincia	indice
1	Modena	134.19	37	Forlì	109.22	70	Brindisi	73.19
2	Como	132.61	38	Lucca	109.14	71	Taranto	72.21
3	Varese	130.82		<i>Friuli-Venezia Giulia</i>	107.95	72	Ragusa	76.60
4	Bologna	128.70	39	Ascoli Piceno	107.71		<i>Puglia</i>	75.74
5	Aosta	128.19		<i>Marche</i>	107.67	73	Catania	75.48
6	Vercelli	127.93	40	Savona	107.18	74	Messina	75.26
7	Milano	127.93	41	Ferrara	106.22	75	Campobasso	74.55
	<i>Lombardia</i>	126.70	42	Roma	105.82		<i>Molise</i>	74.43
8	Bergamo	125.51	43	Udine	105.82	76	Isernia	74.14
9	Reggio Emilia	125.33	44	Rovigo	103.61	77	Napoli	73.72
10	Firenze	124.31	45	Imperia	102.52	78	Lecce	73.61
11	Vicenza	123.96		<i>Lazio</i>	102.47	79	Avellino	73.59
12	Parma	123.87	46	Gorizia	102.40		<i>Sicilia</i>	73.15
13	Brescia	122.97		<i>Liguria</i>	102.33	80	Palermo	73.11
14	Arezzo	122.84	47	Perugia	102.18	81	Trapani	73.11
15	Cremona	122.69	48	Genova	102.02	82	Matera	72.04
16	Pavia	122.04	49	Ancona	101.77		<i>Campania</i>	71.55
	<i>Emilia-Romagna</i>	121.41	50	Bolzano	101.60	83	Oristano	70.51
17	Mantova	120.97	51	Venezia	101.25	84	Nuoro	70.25
18	Torino	120.39	52	Grosseto	101.05		<i>Basilicata</i>	69.65
19	Piacenza	120.16		<i>Trentino-Alto Adige</i>	100.49	85	Salerno	69.62
20	Pistoia	119.32		<i>Umbria</i>	100.41	86	Benevento	68.45
	<i>Piemonte</i>	119.11	53	Trento	99.40	87	Potenza	68.44
21	Novara	118.94	54	Livorno	99.24	88	Caltanissetta	68.14
22	Asti	117.54	55	Rieti	98.23	89	Caserta	68.07
23	Pisa	116.35	56	La Spezia	97.38	90	Agrigento	66.60
24	Verona	116.11	57	Latina	96.07	91	Foggia	65.46
25	Treviso	115.16	58	Teramo	95.95	92	Reggio Calabria	65.35
	<i>Toscana</i>	114.80	59	Terni	95.76		<i>Calabria</i>	63.12
26	Padova	114.78	60	Viterbo	94.28	93	Catanzaro	62.25
27	Cuneo	114.72	61	Massa Carrara	92.18	94	Cosenza	62.25
28	Belluno	114.71	62	Frosinone	88.49	95	Enna	61.01
29	Sondrio	114.44	63	Pescara	88.12		<i>Italia</i>	100.10
	<i>Veneto</i>	113.43		<i>Abruzzo</i>	87.72		<i>Italia nord-occidentale</i>	121.73
30	Pordenone	113.23	64	L'Aquila	85.34		<i>Italia nord-orientale</i>	114.71
31	Siena	112.64	65	Sassari	84.17		<i>Italia settentrionale</i>	113.57
32	Macerata	112.28	66	Chieti	83.05		<i>Italia centrale</i>	106.59
33	Alessandria	111.34	67	Bari	80.43		<i>Italia centro-settentr.</i>	115.23
34	Ravenna	111.28	68	Cagliari	79.49		<i>Italia meridionale</i>	73.43
35	Pesaro e Urbino	111.24	69	Siracusa	78.78			
36	Trieste	109.55		<i>Sardegna</i>	78.36			

Source: Gugliemetti and Rosa, 98.



TABLE 12

Distribution of Resources of the Common Regional Fund  
among Italy's Three Economic Systems, Ordinary Regions Only

	Northwest <sup>a</sup>		Center/Northeast <sup>b</sup>		Mezzogiorno <sup>c</sup>	
	Avg. Allocation in LIT (Mill's) Per Region	% of Fund's Resources	Avg. Allocation in LIT (Mill's) Per Region	% of Fund's Resources	Avg. Allocation in LIT (Mill's) Per Region	% of Fund's Resources
1972	31,719	41.3	22,726	29.6	22,352	29.1
1973	49,227	41.5	34,046	28.7	35,431	29.9
1974	51,085	41.5	34,870	28.3	37,145	30.2
1975	51,921	41.9	34,546	27.9	37,569	30.3
1976	64,079	43.3	40,741	27.6	43,025	29.1
1977	94,844	42.0	63,705	28.2	67,155	29.8
1978	125,288	42.0	84,154	28.2	88,712	29.8
1979	138,685	42.2	92,642	28.2	97,606	29.7
1980	196,684	42.2	131,406	28.2	138,442	29.7
1981	251,932	42.2	168,194	28.2	177,185	29.7
1982	267,963	40.8	207,413	31.6	181,360	27.6
1983	300,203	41.1	228,372	31.3	201,988	27.7
1984	320,739	40.2	250,597	31.4	226,625	28.4
1972-84	149,566	41.4	107,185	29.7	104,199	28.9

Source: Carello, The Northern Question.

<sup>a</sup> Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte

<sup>b</sup> Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Marche, Toscana, Umbria, Veneto

<sup>c</sup> Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia

TABLE 13  
Mafia Extortion in Italy, 1983

	Number of Businesses (1)	Number of Businesses Extorted (2)	$\frac{(2)}{(1)} \times 100$	Mafia's Assassinations and Attempts in 1983
Italy	1,436,742	146,153	10.2	256
Liguria	34,916	349	1.0	---
Lombardia	217,646	10,882	5.0	7
Piemonte	115,651	5,782	5.0	4
Valle d'Aosta	4,197	21	0.5	---
Northwest average	93,103	4,259	4.6	3
Emilia-Romagna	124,617	1,246	1.0	---
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	34,916	349	1.0	---
Lazio	111,595	8,928	8.0	23
Marche	42,179	422	1.0	1
Toscana	102,749	514	.5	4
Trentino-Alto Adige	33,568	1	.003	2
Umbria	19,719	39	.3	1
Veneto	126,628	3,160	2.5	---
Center/northeast average	74,496	1,832	2.5	4
Abruzzo	33,827	338	1.0	2
Basilicata	13,610	68	.5	4
Calabria	47,188	17,931	38.0	57
Campania	110,540	45,760	41.4	61
Molise	7,920	---	---	---
Puglia	87,591	7,008	8.0	21
Sardegna	39,878	798	2.0	8
Sicilia	105,846	42,338	40.0	59
Mezzogiorno average	55,800	14,280	25.6	27

Source: La Repubblica, 23 March 1984, 12.

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